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Abstract 
 
Universal publicly-administered pre-paid health insurance, commonly known as 
public health care or Medicare, is easily Canada’s single most high-profile public policy.  Yet 
very few Canadians understand exactly what the Medicare program is, how it is structured, 
and how it works.  Even fewer are aware that federal provincial intergovernmental relations 
is the crux upon which the entire Medicare program rests, with all the significant attendant 
implications of that reality for the day-to-day lives of millions of Canadians.   
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how Medicare is structured in Canada, distill 
the complex and continually raging debate surrounding this topic into comprehensible, 
clearly articulated worldviews, and expose those worldviews to scholarly analysis. The thesis 
concludes with recommendations for the future direction of the Medicare program based 
upon its findings and analysis. 
To this end, this thesis examines the developmental trajectory of Medicare in Canada 
with a particular emphasis on federal-provincial fiscal relations and their impact on the 
program.  The debate over the best way to structure and operate Medicare is distilled into two 
distinct schools of thought: the ‘centralist’ and the ‘decentralist.’  The positions of each 
school are exposed to a comparative qualitative analysis of their contrasting proposals for 
federal-provincial relations in the health care field.   
The thesis concludes that the ‘centralist’ school of thought is the superior of the two 
proposals and should be implemented given that it provides a blueprint for meaningful reform 
and expansion of the Medicare program while avoiding various pitfalls which are associated 
with the ‘decentralist’ approach.  Further, it is asserted that federal engagement and 
leadership has been essential to the inception and maintenance of Medicare up to the present 
and will be central to the maintenance, reform, and expansion of Medicare moving into the 
future.     
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Foreword  
 
In July 2012, universal publicly-administered pre-paid health insurance, commonly 
known as public health care or Medicare, celebrated its 50th anniversary in Canada, marking 
the passage of five eventful decades since the province of Saskatchewan under Premier T.C. 
Douglas introduced the first publicly-funded, not-for-profit, comprehensive health care 
insurance plan to be found in North America on July 1, 1962.  The advent of Medicare in 
Saskatchewan, and its subsequent adoption on the national scale in the wake of Justice 
Emmet Hall’s Royal Commission Report of 1964, was far from a painless process.  In the 
early days Saskatchewan found itself embroiled in a tempest of protests and doctor’s strikes, 
and the implementation of national Medicare was vigorously opposed by some of the 
provinces, certain ministers of the federal Cabinet, and much of the medical profession. 
Underlying the struggles attendant to the birth of Medicare in Canada, however, are 
the public opinion polls which have consistently indicated that the people of Canada expect 
that their governments recognise, as a fundamentally Canadian societal value, the idea that 
access to health care should be based on need and not on the ability to pay.  Already in a 
1949 Gallup poll, 80 per cent of Canadians indicated that they preferred a model of public 
insurance to a privately funded health insurance model.1  In October 2015, Nanos Research 
reported that, when asked to rank the most important priority if they were Prime Minister, 68 
per cent of respondents chose ‘investments in improving public health’ as their number one 
priority.  Of the eight top issues for voters in that survey, five were directly related to health 
                                                          
1 Malcolm G. Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions That Created the Health 
Insurance System and Their Outcomes, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press: 2009), 166.  The 
question was phrased: ‘Would you approve or disapprove of a National Health Plan whereby you would pay a 
flat rate each month and be assured of complete medical and hospital care by the Dominion government?’  
[emphasis added].  The results of the 1949 Gallup poll were ‘Approve:’ 80 per cent; ‘Disapprove:’ 13 per cent.  
2 
care.2  And when respondents were asked about two-tier health care, where some people 
would be allowed to pay for quicker access to care,  64% of Canadians opposed this, while 
only 34% were open to such a situation.3  This clearly indicates that public health care is one 
issue around which the majority of Canadians can coalesce with a reasonable degree of 
coherency and consistency, and they do. While there is widespread public agreement on the 
basis of the system in the broadest possible sense, however, many Canadians appear unaware 
there has been a fundamental sea change in the field of health care in recent years. 
December 19, 2011 may have seemed just another ordinary Monday to the vast 
majority of Canadians, but to those concerned with the future of Medicare, a day that began 
normally enough saw political fireworks erupt in the early afternoon.  The place: Victoria, 
B.C.; the scene: a meeting of the provincial, territorial, and federal finance ministers.  As the 
provincial and territorial ministers wrapped up a morning of meetings and headed into a 
working lunch with Federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, the latter appeared and began 
passing around copies of a document.  The provincial ministers quickly found, to their 
complete surprise, that the document contained a new, completely revamped funding formula 
for the federal transfers to the provinces for health services.  The provincial ministers had not 
expected to discuss this issue at this particular conference; their first reaction was one of 
confusion and disbelief.  Then one, Graham Steele of Nova Scotia, expecting that the 
document represented a proposal and that the issue would be discussed and negotiated at this 
and future intergovernmental meetings, ventured the question ‘What is the process from here 
                                                          
2 EKOS Politics, ‘Canadian Worried Sick About Health Care,’ October 25, 2015.  Accessed November 18, 2016.  
<http://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2015/10/canadians-worried-sick-about-health-care/>.  
3 Ibid. 
3 
on?’4  As The Globe and Mail related, quoting Mr. Steele ‘...the answer from Mr. Flaherty is 
that there would be no process.  This was Ottawa’s position.’5   
The Harper government which Mr. Flaherty represented has now gone in the 2015 
federal election, but for those who are familiar with the evolution of the national health 
insurance system in Canada, the significance of this particular event is clear.  It represented a 
manifestation of the often-contentious relationship between the federal and provincial 
governments in the field of health care, a relationship which has been critical to determining 
the nature and scope of the system throughout its history.  It is this ongoing federal-provincial 
intergovernmental relationship which is the focus of this thesis.  This thesis will examine the 
trajectory of this complicated political relationship which has been so central to the institution 
of Medicare.  It will examine the pivotal role that the federal order of government has played, 
both in making Medicare a reality in the early stages, and in the maintenance of the program 
over the intervening decades.  Above all, this thesis will address the question of how the 
federal and provincial governments ought best to structure their relationship going forward, 
in order that Canadians may continue to enjoy the very best possible uniquely Canadian 
health care system, a vibrant, efficient, effective Medicare for the 21st century.   
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
This thesis will explore the fiscal arrangements for health care funding in Canada and 
the division of responsibility in health care provision between the federal and provincial 
orders of government from the inception of Medicare to the present.  The central objective of 
this thesis is to provide an account of the contrasting proposals as to what the proper 
intergovernmental relationship between Ottawa and the provinces ought to be, and to 
                                                          
4 Ian Bailey and Bill Curry, ‘Flaherty’s 10-year health-care plan divides provinces.’  The Globe and Mail.  19 Dec. 
2011.  Accessed 1 Jul. 2012 <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/flahertys-10-year-health-care-
plan-divides-provinces/article2277221/>. 
5 Ibid. 
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determine the implications of these proposals for the future of both Medicare and the 
Canadian federation.  The research questions are: 
1. What is the relevant history from program inception to the present in the evolution of 
Medicare in Canada in terms of the fiscal arrangements between Ottawa and the 
provinces, and the division of responsibility between the federal and provincial orders 
of government in the field of health care? 
2. What are the conflicting visions for health care funding arrangements in Canada, and 
the proper roles of the federal and provincial orders of government in relation to the 
health care enterprise moving into the future?  What would the proposals of each of 
these conflicting visions entail in terms of the structure of health care funding 
arrangements and intergovernmental relations in Canada? 
3. What are the implications of each of these contrasting proposed structures of health 
care funding arrangements and federal-provincial roles and responsibilities for the 
structure and functioning of the Canadian federation, as well as for national unity and 
the pan-Canadian identity? 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives & Methodology 
 
In the broader intellectual and theoretical perspective, this thesis should be understood 
as a case study in the operation of a federal system, specifically the Canadian federal system, 
with the Medicare program serving as the focus of inquiry.  All federal systems in existence 
have their own distinctive characteristics, and Canada is no exception.  One of the major 
ways in which federal systems are differentiated is the level to which they are either 
centralised or decentralised.  The more widely that power, authority, financial resources, and 
political support are spread among the orders of government, the higher the level of 
decentralisation. Conversely, the more power, authority, financial resources, and political 
5 
support are concentrated in the central (generally federal) government, the higher the level of 
centralisation.6  
When looking at Canadian federalism in comparative perspective with other 
federations, Canada ranks as one of the world’s most decentralised federations.7  Specifically, 
it can be observed that in international perspective the Canadian provinces have a 
comparatively high degree of autonomy and authority within their jurisdictions, a relatively 
high fiscal capacity, a relatively high political capacity in that they have a strong presence in 
the identities and loyalties of citizens, and a comparatively high level of ability to design and 
deliver public services (a high bureaucratic capacity).8  It is also noteworthy that the 
Canadian federal model is a rather divided federalism, in that there are two very clearly 
differentiated orders of government having two differentiated spheres of authority and, while 
they do cooperate with each other in certain key areas of public policy, at the same time they 
are in competition for political strength and public support.9  
This thesis examines Canadian Medicare within this larger context of centralisation vs 
decentralisation in the operation of federal systems.  Medicare in particular is chosen first 
because of its prominence and central importance in the Canadian context, and second 
because it provides a model of engagement between the orders of government in a federal 
system in order to achieve public policy goods, and also highlights the absolutely central 
importance of federal leadership in achieving over-arching national goals as well as systemic 
change in established public policy programs.  Medicare in Canada casts a light on the 
tension and acrimony that often exists between the orders of government in a federal system, 
while calling to mind a key over-arching question when we examine Canada as a 
                                                          
6 Richard Simeon, 2013, “Decentralization.” The Canadian Encyclopedia, 16 December.  Accessed 20 July 2018.  
< https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/decentralization/>. 
7 Richard Simeon, 2002.  ‘Federalism and Decentralization in Canada.’  The Forum of Federations.  < 
http://www.forumfed.org/library/federalism-and-decentralization-in-canada/>. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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comparatively decentralised federation and very much a country of geographically diverse 
regions with divergent social, economic, and political interests – who speaks for Canada?   
This thesis is intended to form a part of that larger dialogue.  The thesis commences 
with an exposition of relevant empirical facts, and subsequently will undertake a qualitative 
analysis of the effects of those facts upon the Medicare system and the functioning of 
federalism in Canada.  It will draw on both primary and secondary literature.  This will 
include government documents and reports of Royal Commissions, parliamentary committees 
and task forces, and so on.  It will also include reports, position papers, policy proposals and 
briefs, and other publications prepared at the behest of private organisations and think-tanks.  
Also consulted will be academic publications surrounding the issue of healthcare provision 
and federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements and their implications.  News in various 
media such as op-ed publications in newspapers and other reputable publications are also 
utilised.  Lastly, an interview was conducted with one subject matter expert, in particular a 
proponent of the centralist school of thought, in order to fully flesh out the position of the 
centralist school and give clear expression to the full breadth of its positions. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
The body of this thesis is divided into five chapters.  
Chapter 2 is a background chapter and is intended to provide the reader with the 
necessary foundation to understand the trajectory of federal-provincial intergovernmental 
relations.  This chapter is divided by broad eras, with subsections corresponding to significant 
landmark events within the history of Medicare from 1945 to the present. 
Chapter 3 examines what is labelled the ‘decentralist’ or ‘the Boessenkool school of 
thought,’ so-called because its decentralist tenets are expressed most coherently and 
thoroughly by Ken Boessenkool, formerly of the University of Calgary.  The concept of 
7 
Stephen Harper’s ‘open federalism,’ which informs/is informed by Boessenkool’s positions 
on health care, will also be explored in some detail.  
Chapter 4 examines the ‘centralist’ school of thought surrounding the direction 
which federal-provincial intergovernmental relations ought to take on the issues surrounding 
health care moving into the future.  The recommendations of the Royal Commission Report 
Building on Values (2002) will be examined in some detail, and the positions of this school of 
thought on the issues of Canadian values, Canadian unity, and the function of the federation 
will be laid out. 
Chapter 5 is the critical analysis chapter of the thesis.  It examines the various 
implications of the two major schools of thought, and then undertakes a critical analysis of 
both of them in turn.  The end conclusion is that the centralist school of thought is the 
superior of the two alternatives because it provides a framework for meaningful reform and 
expansion of the Medicare system while avoiding the potential pitfalls of the decentralist 
approach.  
  
8 
Chapter 2 – Health Care in Canada: An Historical Overview 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This thesis is at its core about the debate surrounding the proper relationship between 
the federal and provincial orders of government with respect to health care, and about the 
implications which the conflicting visions in play might have.  These issues are not new – 
they have been at the forefront of an at times acrimonious dialogue which has been ongoing 
with varying degrees of intensity since public health care was first introduced.  To make a 
cogent contribution to the emerging discourse of the present day, and to understand the 
complexities of federal-provincial relations regarding Medicare, it is necessary to understand 
how we got to where we are today.  This chapter will explore some of the relevant historical 
background to the implementation and operation of Medicare, which will provide a 
foundation for a discussion of the issues in the later chapters of the thesis.   
2.2 The Early Days of Medicare in Canada: 1867 – 1950 
 
At the time Canada’s Constitution was first ratified as the British North America Act, 
1867, health care was viewed as a private matter, or as falling within the purview of religious 
or charitable organisations.10  By the 1930s up to 1945, however, the expectations of 
Canadians regarding the involvement of government in the provision of social services began 
to increase dramatically,11 perhaps a result of the fact that the Great Depression meant that an 
ever-increasing number of Canadians were simply unable to pay out-of-pocket for even basic 
hospital or physician services.12  The Canadian people increasingly began to demand that 
their access to many basic social services, including health care, would be guaranteed by 
                                                          
10 André Braën, ‘Health and the Distribution of Powers in Canada,’ in T. McIntosh, P-G Forest, and Gregory P. 
Marchildon, eds., The Romanow Papers, Vol. 3: The Governance of Health Care in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2004), 25. 
11 In a Gallup poll conducted in 1944 and again in 1949, for example, some 80 per cent of Canadians expressed 
support for a form of national health insurance scheme.  See Taylor, 166. 
12 GP Marchildon, Health Systems in Transition: Canada.  (Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2005), 21. 
9 
entrusting those services to government, and this in turn raised the issue early on as to which 
order of government ought to be responsible for those services, and further, what the 
relationship between the two orders of government ought to be in this regard.13  
 In the context of this clear upwelling of popular pressure, the first major push for 
some form of national public health coverage came from the federal government at the 
1945/1946 Dominion-Provincial Reconstruction Conference.14  At the conference, the federal 
government put forward a broad package of social security and fiscal changes, including an 
offer to cost-share 60 per cent of the costs of public hospital and medical care insurance.15  
This offer was rebuffed by the provinces based upon their concerns about the administrative 
and tax arrangements that would have accompanied the comprehensive social security 
programme.16  This early failure to implement a national public health insurance scheme 
forced a more piecemeal approach to the introduction of public health care in Canada, led by 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia in particular.17 
2.3 National Hospitalisation Insurance - The HIDSA of 1957 
 
 With the collapse of the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction of 1946 
and the attendant rejection by the provinces of the federal government’s 60 per cent cost-
sharing for health care proposal, ‘the federal government’s idealistic plans for post-war 
Canada were in disarray.  So, too, was the financial position of most of the provinces.’18  
Against this background of failure, however, there were powerful factors pushing toward the 
adoption of at least some form of national health insurance scheme.  First, there was the clear 
public pressure.  There were other, more powerful factors at work, however, namely: 1) 
                                                          
13 Howard Leeson, ‘Constitutional Jurisdiction over Health and Health Care Services in Canada,’ in T. McIntosh, 
P-G Forest, and Gregory P. Marchildon, eds., The Romanow Papers, Vol. 3: The Governance of Health Care in 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 53. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.   
17 Ibid., 21-2. 
18 Taylor, 162.  
10 
Widespread poor health outcomes and lack of medical services for many Canadians;19 2) The 
inequitable distribution of illness in the Canadian population, and more particularly the 
distribution of the costs of illness in said population, both being clearly correlated to income 
level;20 3) Clear disparities in the level of health services available by province, and in the per 
capita burden being imposed on the inhabitants of each of the provinces in order to support 
health care expenditures; 4) Provincial initiatives which deepened the perception of inequity 
from province to province. 
  Points 3 and 4 are of particular concern to the present analysis.  British Columbia had 
one doctor for every 777 persons in 1954; Nova Scotia one for every 1,436; and 
Newfoundland one for every 2,117 people – a disparity of 100 per cent between B.C. and 
N.S., and 200 per cent between B.C. and Newfoundland.21  In terms of expenditures by 
provincial and municipal governments on health care per capita, these ranged from $154 in 
B.C. (54 per cent above the national average), to $68 in Prince Edward Island (43 per cent 
less than the national average).22  However, to finance health care expenditures at that level, 
B.C. spent 2.5 per cent of per capita income, while P.E.I. spent 2.3 per cent – a nearly equal 
burden for far fewer services.23  In other words, ‘In final terms, the capacity of a province – 
in the absence of transfer payments from the federal government – to finance governmental 
goods and services rested on per capita income’ – and the average annual personal income 
per capita in British Columbia was $1,519 from 1952-6, as compared to a mere $660 in 
                                                          
19 Ibid.  The 1946 Review of Canada’s Health Needs and Insurance Proposals by the National Health Bureau 
found that, while Sweden and New Zealand (both of which had state Medicare) had an infant mortality rate of 
29, Canada’s was 54, and the rate was even higher in rural areas: 63 in rural British Columbia, 76 in Manitoba, 
and 79 in Nova Scotia.  The total number of reported days of disability due to illness was 153,500,000, or an 
average of 11.9 days per person, per year.  Furthermore, on average Canadians required an average of 5.6 bed 
days of care per year, at least some of which were spent in hospital. 
20 Ibid.  In terms of the estimated average number of person days of disability per 1,000 persons by income, 
the figures were: Low Income: 17,833; Medium Income: 11,042; High Income, Upper: 11, 384.  Data from the 
survey also showed that low-income persons received significantly less physician care than high-income 
persons: 8.27 units of physician health care received per 100 disability days vs. 21.71 for upper high-income.  
21 Ibid., 177-8. 
22 Ibid., 178. 
23 Taylor, 179, 177.  For example, B.C.’s physician ratio was 1 to 777, vs. 1 to 1,280 in P.E.I. 
11 
Newfoundland, for example (again, a difference of over 100 per cent).24  Taylor expressed 
the significance of these facts best when he summarised them thus: 
It is the primary function of a national government in a federal system to think nationally.  
It must constantly address the question, “What in terms of living standards, and 
particularly in terms of public services, does it mean to be a Canadian citizen?”  It was 
obvious that it meant different – indeed, far different – things province to province.  
Standards of resources and services that varied as much as two or even three times were 
clearly indefensible.  Equally evident was the fact that disparities could be overcome, or 
even ameliorated, only one way – by federal participation in the financing of services with 
large infusion of nationally-collected funds.25 
 
This reality of an urgent need for federal action was exacerbated by the fact that four 
provinces out of ten had varied health insurance programs in operation by 1950, and one in 
particular, which had achieved insurance coverage for nearly the entirety of its population26 
in a publicly-funded health care scheme, was attracting the notice of citizens across the 
country.  In Saskatchewan, the government of T.C. Douglas had promised upon its election in 
1944 to bring in some form of universal health insurance scheme, and in 1947 announced that 
as an intermediate step toward that goal, there would henceforth be a provincial tax-funded, 
purely needs-based hospitalisation insurance plan, making Saskatchewan the first jurisdiction 
in North America to implement such a program.27  The provincial innovation by 
Saskatchewan in particular, but also by British Columbia, Alberta, and Newfoundland to 
respond to the pressures of health care needs in their respective jurisdictions, meant that 
Ottawa was now facing increasing pressure as both citizens and provincial politicians began 
to demand that the federal Liberal party assume a leadership role in these pressing issues and 
honour its 1945 promise of health care cost-sharing.28   
1955 was to be a critical year for the federal government because it would bring the 
requirement to begin the process of re-negotiating the federal-provincial tax agreements, 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 179-80. 
25 Ibid., 179, 181.  
26 Ibid., 170. 
27 Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press), 2006, 
171. 
28 Taylor, 181-2.   
12 
which were set to expire in 1957.29  That necessitated a federal-provincial conference, which 
would invariably mean demands from the provinces not only for improved fiscal terms, but 
also for ‘whatever else might seem of high priority to them.’30  Given the prevailing mood 
among the populace, the worrying statistics laid out above, and the innovation of the 
provinces (some of which, such as Saskatchewan, were now financially on the line for costly 
publicly-funded hospitalisation insurance plans), the issue of federal-provincial cost-sharing 
in a national health care plan could hardly fail to appear somewhere on the conference’s 
agenda.  Despite all this, the initial response of the federal government was not one of 
decisive action and definitive leadership, but one of delay. 
The federal-provincial conference of October 1955 led to continued strong pressure 
from the provincial premiers for some decisive federal action.  At the close of the first day’s 
meetings, it was announced that there would be a committee of the provincial and federal 
ministers of health and finance which would be struck at a later date and which would give 
detailed consideration to the question of a national health insurance scheme.31  The 
appointment of this committee led to the realisation in the federal cabinet that an offer ‘of 
some dimension’ would need to be made to the provinces; it simply could not be delayed any 
longer.32  The eventual federal offer was that the federal government would agree to pay one-
half the national cost of diagnostic services and in-patient hospital care (the provinces, except 
for B.C., had been pushing for 60 per cent).33  The federal contribution to each province in 
respect of its shareable costs would be: 1) 25 per cent of the average per capita cost for 
hospital services in Canada as a whole; plus 2) 25 per cent of the average per capita costs of 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 206. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Taylor, 215. 
32 Ibid., 216.  
33 Ibid., 217. 
13 
the province itself, less any direct charges to patients for services,34 multiplied by the number 
of insured persons in the province.35  This federal offer, however, would take effect only if 
six of the provinces, including at least Ontario or Québec (representing a majority of the 
Canadian population), announced that they were ready to proceed with such a cost-sharing 
plan, and the proposed provincial plans were required to provide for universal coverage for 
all of a province’s residents.36 
On April 10, 1957, the federal Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act 
(HIDSA), which formalised these arrangements, was passed in Parliament by a unanimous 
vote of 165-0.  As of July 1, 1958, Newfoundland, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and 
British Columbia had plans in operation eligible for federal cost-sharing; Ontario came on 
board on January 1, 1959, as did Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.37  Thus ‘six provinces 
that had not been previously involved in hospital insurance launched programs meeting the 
federal conditions.  With uniform definitions of residency...and uniform benefits, ten 
provincial plans were melded into the reality of a national program.  By 1961 almost the total 
population of Canada was entitled to the same comprehensive hospital care benefits enjoyed 
by the people of Saskatchewan and British Columbia for over a decade.’38   
It was, however, ‘a tough contract the provinces were required to sign.’39  The degree 
of federal control over the program was extraordinary, for every essential requirement for the 
operation of a program was prescribed and enforced by the federal government.40  
Furthermore, the provincial governments were saddled with a good number of administrative 
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burdens.41  True, the provinces did benefit from having a cost-sharing program in place, but 
over time the financing formula, which was intended to provide some degree of equalisation, 
proved to be an imperfect instrument, since provincial per capita costs were not perfectly 
correlated with per capita income.42  Despite these issues, however, there is no doubt that the 
HIDSA was an historic achievement.  The resultant system, while not perfect, was a crucial 
stepping stone on the road to universal Medicare. 
2.4 ‘The Original Deal:’ Pearson and the Original National Health Care System 1965-
1977 
 
 As the next act in the story of Canadian health care opened on July 19, 1965, Lester 
B. Pearson had replaced Louis St. Laurent as leader of the Liberal party, and the contrast 
between their opening statements at the federal-provincial conferences could not have been 
greater, or a clearer demonstration of the differences between them.  ‘The provision of health 
services...[is] the item on our agenda which is the most important of all,’ Pearson began.  He 
continued ‘Accordingly, I repeat that it is now the responsibility of the federal government to 
cooperate with the provinces in making Medicare financially possible for all Canadians.  The 
government accepts that responsibility [emphasis added].’43  Despite the minority position of 
the Pearson Liberal government elected in 1963, the decision for universal national health 
insurance appeared imminent.  However, there was to be a significant struggle before 
national health insurance would be implemented in the country. 
 The imperatives for federal action were clear.  Above all there was the force of public 
expectation.  The Liberals had first promised national Medicare in their 1919 platform, and 
then again had raised the issue with the (eventually rejected) 1945 Green Book proposals 
associated with the Dominion-Provincial Reconstruction Conference.  Thus, the issue of 
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national health insurance was now firmly associated in the public mind with the Liberal 
Party, and the fact that this promise had not been delivered on in the intervening forty years 
was a glaring incongruence.  This was reinforced by the fact that national hospitalisation 
insurance had been a success, creating anticipation amongst the public that the ‘other shoe’ 
must sooner rather than later be dropped.44  It would seem that “Somehow, it had become a 
natural, normal expectation that awaited only the time when a special concatenation of 
political forces, public attitudes, and determined leadership would reach the necessary 
‘critical mass’ and the dream would be realised.”45 
 Adding fuel to the fire was the newly released report of the Royal Commission on 
Health Services chaired by Emmett M. Hall, delivered on June 19, 1964.  Hall recommended 
‘a comprehensive, universal Health Services programme’ to meet the health needs of 
Canadians, and that ‘the Federal Government enter into agreement with the provinces to 
provide grants on a fiscal need formula to assist the provinces to introduce and operate 
comprehensive, universal, provincial programs of personal health services.’46  The evidence 
gathered by Hall’s Royal Commission also highlighted that the unmet health needs of the 
Canadian populace remained considerable and serious despite hospitalisation insurance.47  
 However, the federal government was also facing several serious constraints in its 
scope of action on the issue of a national health insurance plan.  Although it was generally 
recognised that the federal government retained its right to dispense its funds when and how 
it chose, the position of the provinces in the 1960s stood in sharp contrast to that which 
prevailed in the 1950s during the negotiations surrounding national hospitalisation insurance.  
                                                          
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Taylor, 342-5. 
47 Ibid., 353.  Infant mortality and incidence of illness remained high, there was an inadequate supply of 
trained personnel, a general lack of adequate health insurance among wide sectors of the population, a highly 
inequitable pattern of expenditures by the provinces on health services, and a very widely varying fiscal 
capacity on the part of those same provinces to act to address these problems. 
16 
By the 1960s, Québec under Premier Lesage was making unprecedented demands for an 
ever-increasing degree of autonomy, and the federal government was confronted with a group 
of determined premiers backed by solid majorities who had no interest in accepting Ottawa’s 
largesse any longer if it meant accepting Ottawa’s dictates as well.48  
 The provinces were increasingly unwilling to accept what they saw as the burdens 
imposed upon them by ‘shared-cost programs’ in general, of which national health insurance 
was one.  Better termed a ‘conditional-grant-in-aid,’ the provinces resented the conditions 
which were imposed upon them under this arrangement, which they claimed eroded 
provincial autonomy and had the effect of distorting provincial fiscal priorities.49  It was clear 
that federal leadership was needed on the issue of national health insurance, but it was 
equally clear that the federal government was facing serious constraints in what was 
acceptable policy to the provinces. 
 Meanwhile, however, things were proceeding apace in Ottawa.  Remarkably, in the 
initial stages of the policy process, there was a strong leadership bloc which was universally 
dedicated to the national health insurance project: Prime Minister Pearson, Health Minister 
Judy LaMarsh, and Finance Minister Walter Gordon were all pro-Medicare.50  The Health 
Department had struck fourteen committees to consider in detail the various 
recommendations of the Hall Commission report delivered in June 1964.51  These committees 
initially envisaged a system much like that which prevailed under national hospitalisation 
insurance, and the proposal they submitted to the committee struck by Mr. Pearson comprised 
of senior officials from Health, Finance, and the Privy Council Office (PCO) clearly reflected 
that line of thinking.  The Prime Minister, however, was acutely aware that there was no 
possibility that such a model would be accepted by the provinces.  While federal leadership 
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was clearly essential if all Canadians were to be insured, the requirements of the Hospital 
Insurance Act of a formal agreement and provision for detailed federal auditing of provincial 
accounts were out of the question.  Instead, respecting the federal nature of the Canadian 
system, the proposal would need to be based upon ‘a general understanding of what a 
Medicare program was, an agreement only on general principles,’ upon the basis of which ten 
reasonably similar (but not identical) provincial plans were to be put in place.52  As Taylor 
relates: 
Accordingly, in the interdepartmental committee, ‘principles’ or ‘criteria’ were examined, rejected, 
refined and reduced to the absolute minimum, until four remained: comprehensive, universal, 
publicly administered, and portable.  Gone would be the need for written agreements and for federal 
audit, that irritant and symbol of provincial subordination.  It was simplicity itself.  Not a federal 
program, but ten provincial programs that together with federal sharing would aggregate to a national 
program of uniform minimum standards for all Canadians.53 
 
It was, in other words, a model of federalism in action. 
There was one other fundamental detail to be worked out which would accord with 
the new political reality, and that was a mutually acceptable cost-sharing formula.  The 
federal government preferred a fixed per capita amount, which would allow it to limit the 
growth of the transfers, but that was plainly going to be unacceptable to the provinces.54  
Similarly, the hospitalisation insurance funding model could not be countenanced.  Since the 
provinces would not tolerate federal auditing, to be consistent the federal government would 
have to be equally blind to individual program costs in each province; and under 
hospitalisation insurance, the federal contribution was determined by each province’s per 
capita costs.55  The only alternative, therefore, was to establish a single national figure, a 
national per capita cost.  Calculations indicated that if the federal government paid one-half 
of that amount on behalf of every insured person, it would mean the federal Treasury would 
be covering a little less than half the cost in the wealthier provinces, and up to 80 per cent in 
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the poorer provinces – in other words, ‘it would be a serendipitous outcome that all (or 
almost all) would applaud.’56  In the end, the proposal (which was ultimately to be 
implemented under the terms of the Medical Care Act) was as follows: the federal 
government committed to pay each province half the national per capita cost of providing 
insured hospitalisation and health services, multiplied by the average number of insured 
persons in that province in the year in question.57 
 Health Minister Allan MacEachen moved in June 1966 to begin piloting the necessary 
legislation through Parliament.  He had hoped to be able to get the Medical Care Act through 
to Second Reading before summer recess, but, in his words, 
...I went to the cabinet and said the bill is ready, let’s get it through before the summer adjournment.  
The medical profession is reconciled to its enactment.  Note the word reconciled.  I argued that the 
provinces should not be given a further opportunity to regroup and continue their opposition to 
Medicare.  I argued that we ought to act urgently.  Well, I failed in that effort…In August of that 
year...the cabinet felt that the strong reaction…from many provinces provided an opportunity to re-
open the whole question of Medicare...And that gave Mr. Sharp [the federal Minister of Finance] an 
opportunity to come to cabinet later on in August, arguing for an indefinite postponement of 
Medicare.  That failed, and we had a terrible row in the Cabinet.  Everybody was unhappy and we 
settled that we would defer the beginning of Medicare for one year.58 
 
The delay instigated in Cabinet by Finance Minister Sharp resulted in a blowback 
effect as opponents of Medicare across Canada took advantage of the extra breathing room to 
mount a final offensive against a national public health insurance plan.59  At the regularly-
scheduled Provincial Premiers Conference in Toronto on August 1-2, 1966, as Taylor relates, 
“So strident were the tones, so angry the voices, so vehement the opposition, that one 
journalist summed up ‘the Federal government’s proposed legislation lies torn, tattered, and 
politically rejected.’”60  To again quote MacEachen’s reflections: 
Well it would be unnatural, unexpected...for the provinces to remain silent.  They took 
advantage of the divisions within Cabinet by renewing their opposition to Medicare.  At 
that particular time, Mr. Pearson was also dealing with the Constitution at a big conference.  
And at that conference, he felt the full brunt from the provincial premiers, the full brunt of 
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their discontent on the subject of Medicare…So it was in this atmosphere of provincial 
opposition and division within the cabinet, that Mr. Pearson finally decided that we would 
go ahead with the Medicare programme...And without his decisive action at that time, 
because he finally made the decision, we may have lost the whole issue [emphasis added].61  
    
The issue, therefore, appeared to be settled, at least for the present moment, by the 
determined intervention of the Prime Minister.  Despite the best efforts of the opponents of 
Medicare both in and outside of Cabinet, the Medical Care Act finally passed Third Reading 
on December 8, 1966, by a vote of 177 ‘Yeas’ to just two ‘Nays.’62   
 On the inaugural date of July 1, 1968, only Saskatchewan and British Columbia 
qualified for federal contributions under the new plan.63  Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and 
Manitoba quickly followed at the beginning of 1969, with Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, Prince 
Edward Island, and New Brunswick after that, in that order.64  It was a resounding success, 
for ‘whatever the political and economic costs that would impinge upon other provincial 
priorities, ten provincial programs with portable benefits finally came into being and a 
national plan was born.’65  For as had been the case with hospitalisation insurance, if a 
province chose not to join in these arrangements, its residents would effectively be 
subsidising through the federal taxes they paid the residents of the provinces which did 
choose to participate.  In other words, for practical reasons the provinces could not afford to 
remain outside such an arrangement.66  This presented an irresistible incentive for the 
provinces to come on board. 
 There were both similarities and some differences to the formulation and 
implementation of national hospitalisation insurance ten years before.  What had definitely 
changed was the position of the provinces, which had become much more confrontational and 
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assertive in their relationship with the federal government.  The federal government for its 
part proved out of necessity to be more sensitive to provincial needs, concerns, and priorities, 
and the system and funding formula it proposed were heavily shaped by the constraints of 
what would be deemed acceptable to the provinces.  Indeed, despite the provincial 
complaints, there had actually been quite extensive intergovernmental consultations, both at 
the federal-provincial conferences and more informally.   
One thing which was not new in the decision for Medicare was the clearly 
demonstrated need for strong federal leadership, without which such a comprehensive 
program would never have been implemented.  Prime Minister Pearson’s skilled handling of 
federal-provincial diplomacy in an area of joint constitutional jurisdiction was a key factor in 
the success of the Medicare proposal.  He proved adept at judging how far the provincial 
governments were prepared to let the federal government push in terms of a national plan, 
and the committee he struck, which offered a proposal of ten provincial plans centred around 
a tight constellation of core values, not only greatly increased the chances of provincial 
acceptance, but proved to be an enduring framework.  The progressive cadre of Allan J. 
MacEachen, Judy LaMarsh, Walter Gordon, Paul Martin Sr., and others pushed Medicare 
through a Cabinet which was divided and against a Finance Minister who tried every tactic of 
delay and hindrance he could muster to derail the project.  Tremendous credit is also due to 
the leadership of Mr. Pearson, who, at the eleventh hour, when the opponents of Medicare 
had all but succeeded in their quest to kill the proposal in Cabinet, showed strength and the 
courage of his humanitarian convictions when he declared that debate was closed and the 
programme was going forward.  
There was no question that the road to the adoption of Medicare in Canada had been 
one of the most tumultuous series of events in the history of the country’s public life.  Yet 
despite the upheaval, the result was unquestionably a major gain for the people of Canada, 
21 
who were now entitled to a reasonably uniform level of comprehensive health and 
hospitalisation care based upon need, not upon ability to pre-pay for insurance coverage, or in 
what province they happened to reside.  At the same time, Medicare was a uniquely Canadian 
compromise which respected both the constitutional and political reality of the country: the 
federal leadership recognised the desire of the provinces for greater autonomy; and presented 
for provincial acceptance a plan which would both equalise regional disparities, and be based 
not upon a rigid, monolithic imposition of a national design, but instead a more flexible series 
of independent provincial plans linked together by a series of core national values.  As Allan 
MacEachen put it,  
It is normal...in the Canadian context [that] the achievement of important projects is linked to 
controversy and bruising.  And it certainly happened on this occasion.  Bruising of the Prime 
Minister, the premiers, ministers, and probably the medical profession.  However, that is part of 
politics.  That is public service and public life.  The result, however, was a major gain for the people 
of Canada.  The fundamental principles adopted in the 1960s have been recently assessed and 
scrutinised thirty-seven years later by the Royal Commission [on the Future of Health Care in 
Canada] under Roy Romanow.  His conclusions are that these principles are of enduring value and 
should continue to be a cornerstone of our public health system.  So, I conclude by saying, that in 
truth Mr. Pearson was right when he said that the passing of the Medical Care Act on December 21 in 
1966 was a major triumph.67   
 
2.5 Established Programs Financing and the Canada Health Act – Health Care in 
Canada 1977-1990 
 
 The next major milestone in the history of health care in Canada came in the 1970s.  
Despite the overall success and strong public support for the hospital and medical care 
programs,68 both the federal and provincial governments had concerns about the funding 
formula within a few years of implementation of the Medical Care Act in 1966.  For their 
part, the provinces found the inflexible administrative details they had been required to agree 
to under the terms of the Hospital Insurance Act objectionable, they resented the federal audit 
to determine shareable costs, and they claimed that federal funding of just two programs had 
the effect of distorting their priorities and fiscal resource allocation processes.69  The federal 
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government, committed by its own legislation to match provincial fiscal outlays on health, 
was concerned that it had no control over the rapidly rising provincial budgets for hospital 
and medical services, as well as for welfare and post-secondary education.70  A sense of a 
‘health cost spiral’ pervaded the whole system, not least in the upper echelons of the Finance 
Department in Ottawa.71  With the federal government increasingly convinced that it must 
gain immediate control of its health care expenditures, the stage was set for a major 
restructuring of the financial arrangements underpinning Canadian Medicare.72 
At the federal-provincial conference in June 1976, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
opened by proposing total termination of the open-ended 50-50 cost-sharing arrangements for 
post-secondary education and for the two health programs (medical insurance and 
hospitalisation insurance, together comprising the national Medicare program), and proposed 
instead that the federal government would vacate income tax room which the provinces 
would be free to occupy.73  In December 1976, the provinces responded with a unanimous 
counter-proposal demanding an additional four tax points as a continuation of the (in fact 
unrelated) 1972 ‘revenue guarantee.’74  The federal Finance Minister rejected this proposal. 
After a period of intense intergovernmental negotiations, the matter was again taken up at the 
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First Ministers conference in December 1976.  At that meeting, the provinces remained set in 
their demand that the 1972 ‘revenue guarantee’ be continued, a position the federal 
government was unwilling to accept.75  Finally, to achieve agreement, the federal government 
compromised, making a two-part offer of a transfer of tax points, and a cash transfer 
component.  The offer was as follows: the two health and one post-secondary education cost-
sharing programs previously in existence would be rolled into a single block transfer; the 
transfer would comprise one additional tax point (for a total of 13.5 personal income tax 
points), and its 1975-76 equivalent in cash, adjusted as for the basic cash grant – this came to 
one-half of the amount the provinces had been demanding.76  As for the basic cash transfer, it 
was set to be equal to 50 per cent of the national average per capita federal contribution for 
the three programs (hospitalisation insurance, health insurance, post-secondary education) in 
the base year (1975/6), plus a small dollar amount, multiplied by provincial population, and 
adjusted by an escalator linked to the rate of growth in per capita GNP.77  This arrangement 
was incorporated into the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established 
Programs Financing Act (EPF) and became operational for the period April 1, 1977 to March 
31, 1982. 
 The advent of EPF marked a fundamental change in Canadian federalism in respect to 
health care funding.  First, it permanently ended cost-sharing, which gave the provincial 
governments more incentive to manage their health and education expenditures more 
efficiently, and left them with the greater flexibility to determine their own fiscal priorities, as 
well as removing the irritant of forcing them to keep books which the federal government 
would audit.78  From the federal perspective, Ottawa had been successful at placing relatively 
concrete limits on the amount of provincial health insurance costs which the federal Treasury 
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could be held responsible for, thus achieving their most central objective, but this came at a 
cost: the ability of the federal government to ensure that the principles that had underpinned 
public medical and hospital insurance were maintained was significantly undermined.79  The 
complicated changes brought in under EPF were also the major factor adding to the confusion 
which has persisted to this day regarding how much the federal government actually 
contributes to provincial health care programs.80  This has proven not only to be a major 
irritant in intergovernmental affairs, but has also been used as ammunition in an ongoing war 
of calculations between the federal and provincial orders of government which reached its 
zenith through the 1990s, and still persists today.    
While Ottawa was increasingly retracting its financial contribution to healthcare in the 
face of fiscal pressures, however, it was also becoming increasingly concerned about the 
erosion of the principles enshrined in the Hospital Insurance and Medical Care Acts.  After 
EPF was put in place, there were no enforcement measures or penalty provisions available to 
the federal government in the event that the provincial governments breached the conditions 
of the Acts, and the amount of extra-billing by physicians and hospital-imposed user fees 
sharply increased in the wake of the change to EPF. 81 
The rapid increase in extra-billing and user-fees brought discussion of the issue to a 
fever pitch in the election of 1979.  Bolstered by the 1980 Health Services Review report 
chaired by Emmett Hall, which found that user-fees and extra-billing threatened to create a 
two-tier system, and by the report of an all-party parliamentary task force in August 1981 
recommending that the federal government implement legislation to penalise provinces which 
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permitted those practices, Health Minister Monique Bégin ordered her department to produce 
a White Paper policy proposal for just such a piece of legislation, which was presented to the 
meeting of federal and provincial health ministers on May 26, 1982.82  The provincial 
governments were furious: ‘electioneering,’ ‘blackmail,’ ‘a poor example of federal-
provincial cooperation,’ ‘will seriously damage the health care system’ were among their 
reactions.83  The head of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), Dr. Marc Baltzan, stated 
that ‘It is an obvious backdoor intrusion into an area of provincial jurisdiction...Ottawa 
cannot directly legislate how health care programs are financed and administered, so Madame 
Bégin plans to use Ottawa’s fiscal leverage, some would call it, financial blackmail, to force 
provincial governments to operate provincial health care programs according to the dictates 
of the federal government.’84   
Despite the opposition of the provinces, however, Bill C-3 passed Third Reading as 
the Canada Health Act (CHA) on April 17, 1984, with an effective date of April 28, 1984.85  
From a legal standpoint, the CHA consolidated the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic 
Services Act of 1957 and the Medical Care Act of 1966, and defined more precisely the 
conditions under which federal transfers to the provinces would (or would not) continue to be 
made.86  The five principles of Medicare in Canada were re-affirmed and enshrined in the Act 
as enforceable by the federal government, and were as follows: public administration, 
comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and accessibility.87  Furthermore, the federal 
government was given a reasonably ‘fine-toothed’ enforcement instrument in that it was 
empowered to withhold the federal cash contribution to a province at an amount equivalent to 
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the total of any extra-billing or user-fees permitted by that province, as well as discretionary 
penalties for violations of the other conditions.88 
The importance of the CHA to the story of Medicare in Canada cannot be 
underestimated.  Determined federal leadership in the person of Monique Bégin, backed by 
the recommendations of the Health Services Review of 1980 and the all-party parliamentary 
task force report of 1981, allowed the CHA legislation to move forward and be placed into 
the statute books as a solid protection for the Medicare system in the face of strongly opposed 
provincial governments and the vociferous condemnation of the CMA.  True, the CHA was a 
unilateral imposition by the federal government on the provinces, and the legislation did 
make Ottawa judge, jury, and executioner when it came to the enforcement of the five core 
values of Canadian health care, particularly accessibility.89  More fundamentally, however, 
these five criteria, which started out merely as technical legal requirements which had to be 
met to allow federal health transfers to flow to the provinces, have come to be enshrined in 
the Canadian political culture and public discourse as being foundational to the conception of 
the vast majority of Canadians as to what a health care system ought to be: publicly-
administered and financed, with portable and comprehensive benefits, universally available to 
every citizen of Canada, and accessible based upon need, not upon ability to pay.90  The 
Canada Health Act has thus become both the embodiment of and the protective bulwark for 
that constellation of values.   
2.6 Crisis, Withdrawal, Fiscal Retreat, and Dysfunction – The ‘Dark Decade’ of the 
1990s 
 
Since the implementation of the CHA and strong federal action in the field in the 
1980s, however, the situation has become rather less clear-cut.  The Canada Health Act’s 
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Sec. 20 power to impose dollar-for-dollar and/or discretionary financial penalties for 
violations of the five principles has not been effectively enforced, evidenced by Québec’s 
failure to fully adhere to the portability requirements of the CHA, as just one example.91  This 
failure on the part of the federal government to vigorously enforce this centrally important 
piece of legislation has been compounded by the fact that, through the 1990s, federal transfer 
payments for health were cut drastically and unilaterally as Ottawa attempted to put its fiscal 
house in order, which obviously had serious repercussions for the provinces as they struggled 
to maintain the integrity of their health care delivery systems. 92   These unilateral cuts not 
only jeopardised Ottawa’s legitimacy as the traditional ‘guardian and enforcer’ of Medicare, 
but also created lasting intergovernmental tensions.93  This is largely because of the fact that 
while Ottawa attempted to maintain its central role as the enforcer of the core values of 
Medicare on the policy front, it was increasingly withdrawing from the fiscal aspects of 
participation in the system.  In other words, the level of policy input it sought was not 
commensurate to the increasingly limited financial contribution it was willing to make, 
leading some scholars to suggest that Ottawa needed to start ‘paying to play.’94   
This was further exacerbated by Ottawa’s move in 1995 to combine the health 
funding transfer into the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), which contained 
funding for post-secondary education and other social programs as well as health care, all 
rolled into one.  This trend began with the introduction of the EPF regime, when transfers for 
health were combined with those for education, and half of Ottawa’s cash contribution was 
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converted to a permanent transfer of tax points.  Despite this, Ottawa still counts that 1977 
transfer as part of its total contribution to health, while the provinces do not.95  The CHST 
further complicated the funding arrangements, providing ammunition for a continuing battle 
of calculations between the federal and provincial governments regarding the true federal 
share of Medicare spending.  Marchildon summarised it best when he said that, when the 
CHST was introduced in 1995/6, it 
...changed the assumptions on which the original federal-provincial Medicare bargain had been struck 
and precipitated a major struggle between the federal government and the provinces...The country 
was subjected to a series of episodic and unpredictable negotiations producing one-off agreements on 
escalation [of federal revenue transfers for health] that were little more than temporary ceasefires in 
the continuing war between Ottawa and the provinces.96 
 
2.7 From Building on Values and a ‘Fix for a Generation’ to the Present 
 
In short, although health care has been more or less the salient issue in federal-
provincial relations from 1990 to the present, the relations between the two orders of 
government in regard to this issue have not improved, but instead have been somewhat 
dysfunctional.  Largely ignoring the newly delivered recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada of 2002, in 2003 Prime Minister Paul 
Martin agreed to very large increases in federal health transfers (a $2.1 billion ‘top-up,’ a $16 
billion investment in a five-year ‘Health Reform Fund,’ this to be enriched by a further $2 
billion, one-time top-up the following year) and a six per cent year-over-year escalator clause 
while imposing no conditions which the provinces would have to meet in order to gain access 
to those federal dollars.97  In so doing the federal government missed a potential opportunity 
to reform and strengthen the terms and enforcement of the Canada Health Act, and provided 
                                                          
95 Marchildon, Health Systems, 44. 
96 Ibid., 110. 
97 Gregory P. Marchildon, ‘Three Choices for the Future of Medicare,’ (The Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 
2004), 2.  
29 
further precedent for a continuing dynamic of blame-casting and provincial demands of more 
non-conditional federal dollars for healthcare.98   
Finance Minister Flaherty’s springing of a fait accompli health care funding proposal 
upon unsuspecting provincial ministers and officials over a luncheon in Victoria in 2011 is 
yet another example of what the provinces perceive as federal unilateralism.  The tenure of 
Prime Minister Harper was largely characterised by a refusal by the federal government to 
engage with the provincial governments in general, and certainly a refusal to engage in the 
type of intensive and protracted negotiations which characterised the early development of 
Medicare.  The 2011 Victoria meeting will doubtless be seen by some as emblematic of the 
Harper government’s approach to governance and represented the most intensive attention 
given to the file during Harper’s time in power.   
We are presently a little over halfway through the first term of Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau, who was elected in October 2015 under a campaign of ‘sunny ways’ in which he 
promised sweeping political change (e.g. electoral reform) as well as social and economic 
reforms to benefit the middle class.  The Liberal platform committed the federal government 
to re-engage with the provinces to reach a new health accord and ‘provide the collaborative 
federal leadership that has been missing during the Harper decade,’ invest $3 billion over 
four years to improve homecare services, and partner with the provinces to control drug costs 
by buying in bulk.99  The federal and provincial governments met in late 2016 to negotiate a 
new health accord.  The federal offer was 3.5 per cent annual increases to the federal health 
transfer at a value of about $20 billion, and $11.5-billion over 10 years to be spent on mental 
health, home care, and other areas.100  The provinces took the position that the federal offer 
was too low, that the federal government was taking a take-it-or-leave it rather than a 
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collaborative approach to negotiations, and that putting conditions such as the targeted 
priorities on the transfers was, in the words of Quebec’s Health Minister, ‘patronising.’101  
The Hill Times, quoting anonymous sources in the federal government, reported that the 
provinces apparently regarded the federal position as a bargaining tactic and did not take it 
seriously.102  On December 19, 2016, the provinces collectively rejected the federal 
government’s offer entirely.  The ‘script,’ if so it can be called, was being acted out to the 
letter, until three days later when the federal government, abandoning the prospect of a pan-
Canadian health accord, inked a bilateral health accord deal with New Brunswick, and with 
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador the next day.  On January 16, 2017 all three 
territories followed, and Saskatchewan the next day signed a bilateral health accord deal 
complete with a one-year amnesty from federal penalties for the provinces parallel private 
MRI system.  As The Toronto Star reported on March 10, 2017, Ontario was the latest 
signatory to a bilateral health accord with the federal government: ‘That means all provinces 
and territories except for Manitoba have now signed off on new funding arrangements, 
ending months of inter-governmental squabbling and political grandstanding.’103  The final 
holdout inked an agreement with the federal government on August 21, 2017, at which time 
federal Health Minister Jane Philpott stated ‘we now have a pan-Canadian agreement.’104  
With thirteen separate bilateral agreements each with its own terms and conditions, to call the 
result a ‘pan-Canadian agreement’ seems to take a rather liberal view of that term. 
As the evidence laid out in the preceding pages would seem to indicate, national 
public health insurance in Canada has by and large been made possible and maintained, and 
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is at base, a partnership between two co-equal orders of government.  But the past twenty 
years have seemingly brought a fundamental change in that assumption: health care has 
become less a partnership and more a battleground.  Tension and acrimony have always been 
a natural part of the political life of the Canadian federation, and the achievement of national 
hospitalisation insurance and national health insurance did not come without significant 
unrest and discord.  The key difference between the present situation and that prevailing 
during the implementation of national public health insurance, however, is that in the latter 
case both orders of government engaged with one another in an ultimately mutually 
beneficial intergovernmental process which was to the greater good of all Canadians.  The 
past twenty years have seen a reversal of that paradigm. 
2.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has been an overview of the relevant history in the field of health care 
and federal-provincial roles and relations.  What should have emerged clearly in the 
preceding paragraphs is a picture of cooperative beginnings which have over time degraded 
into a situation of deepening dysfunction in the federal-provincial health care stewardship 
relationship, a dysfunction which is not only hampering needed reform to the health care 
system as it currently exists, but may actually threaten its demise.  Of course, there is no 
shortage of differing opinions and schools of thought as to which direction the two orders of 
government ought to proceed in relation to one another on the health care file.  The next two 
chapters will proceed to examine the two major schools of thought which surround this issue 
of federal-provincial relations regarding health care funding moving into the future.  
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Chapter 3 – Proposals for Future Directions: The Decentralist School 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 The preceding chapter examined the developmental trajectory of the Canadian health 
care system from its early constitutional underpinnings to the present.  The next objective 
moving forward is to examine the different proposals which have been advanced as to what 
the proper direction for the Canadian health care system ought to be in years to come i.e. 
what form federal-provincial intergovernmental relations ought to take, and what the 
implications of those differing conceptions of the proper relationship between the two orders 
of government will be, with an emphasis on fiscal relations.   
 For the purposes of the present analysis, there are two broad schools of thought in 
play when it comes to the question of the future of Canadian health care.  One vision, 
advocated by figures such as former Royal Commissioner on Health Care Roy Romanow and 
academics such as Gregory P. Marchildon, is a predominantly centralist one.  The other, 
espoused by figures such as the Calgary School of Public Policy’s Ronald Kneebone and 
Kenneth Boessenkool, has an undeniably decentralist bent.   This chapter will examine the 
positions of the ‘decentralist school’ on the question of intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
the future direction of the health care system in Canada and explore the potential implications 
thereof.  It will begin by examining the basic theoretical underpinnings of the decentralist 
school, move to an exposition of the decentralist vision of federalism and the Canadian 
federation, and end by undertaking an analysis of the actions of the Conservative government 
of Stephen Harper prior to its defeat in the 2015 general election as a model of ‘open 
federalism’ with regard to health care.  
3.2 Theoretical Underpinnings – Boessenkool, the Calgary School, and (Fiscal) 
Federalism 
 
 In the December 2010 issue of the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy 
Research Papers, Kenneth Boessenkool published an article entitled ‘Fixing the Fiscal 
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Imbalance: Turning GST revenues over to the provinces in exchange for lower transfers.’  In 
this article, he proposed that the federal government completely phase out its transfers under 
both the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST), effectively 
ending any federal funding in the field of health and social policy.105  In place of this, 
Boessenkool proposed the transfer of an entire tax field, namely that currently occupied by 
the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST), from the federal order of government to the 
provinces.  This, he asserted, would allow the provinces to fund and to better shape their 
health and social expenses from own-source revenues.106  To deal with the inevitable 
inequality in the fiscal capacity of the various provinces to raise the necessary revenue 
through the GST, Boessenkool proposed a series of ‘equalisation adjustments,’ potential 
models for which he presented in two separate proposals.  Under the first proposal, the GST 
transfer would be equalised to the national average so that the combination of the GST 
transfer and additional equalisation would give each province at least $767 per capita.107  
However, this would still leave some provinces getting more, so his second proposal would 
use the same system (transfer of the entirety of the GST), but with equalisation both ‘up and 
down.’  Under this second proposal, the ‘have’ provinces would have their transfers adjusted 
downward to the national average (whereas under proposal one they would keep any 
additional revenue they raised); while as before, the have-not provinces would be equalised 
upward to ensure that, between the revenue they had raised through the GST and equalisation 
paid out by the federal government, they had at least $767 per capita of so-called own-source 
revenue to spend on health care and social programs.108 
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 Boessenkool’s proposal for a one-time full transfer of a currently federal tax field to 
the provinces is not the first of its kind in the Canadian political discourse.  Decentralist 
academics have primarily concerned themselves with what might be termed the questions of 
‘fiscal federalism.’  They have tended to eschew larger questions about national unity, 
meaningful social citizenship, and so on, instead emphasising normative analyses and 
theories of federalism which focus on the fiscal relations between the federal and 
provincial/territorial orders of government.  For decentralists in the field of health care, this 
has tended to manifest itself on a consistent basis in a preference for the federal government 
to remove itself from the field of health care. 
 Boessenkool’s GST tax-transfer proposal is the most dramatic manifestation of this 
phenomenon because it would represent a total and likely final federal withdrawal from a 
meaningful policy role in the health care field.  While the federal government would maintain 
some nominal level of equalisation transfer under either of Boessenkool’s proposals, this 
would certainly not be the sort of conditional transfer which is currently in place under the 
terms of the federal Canada Health Act.  Rather, it would represent merely a non-conditional 
equalising of provincial fiscal capacities, with the provinces free to spend that revenue, once 
equalised up to a given point, exactly as they saw fit.  In other words, although Boessenkool 
suggests that the federal government would continue to transfer to the provinces and could 
place conditions on them by means of what he calls a ‘GST tax collection agreement,’109 this 
does seem to have the nature of an attempt to pay lip service to the position of those who 
have raised concerns about the implications of a total federal withdrawal from the health care 
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field.  Almost certainly any sort of ‘GST collection agreement’ of the sort envisioned by 
Boessenkool would not include the level of conditionality encapsulated in the CHA.  In short, 
despite the lip service he pays to the idea of a continuing federal transfer, Boessenkool clearly 
envisions a federation where the federal government no longer has a significant role to play 
in health care, a marked departure from the past trajectory of the system. 
 Boessenkool and other decentralist thinkers justify the withdrawal of the federal 
government from health care based on a number of rationales – some are primarily economic, 
while others also incorporate political considerations and theories of federalism to a certain 
degree.  The clearest statement of the decentralist rationale in terms of economics can be 
gleaned from a reading of Ronald Kneebone’s June 2012 article in the University of Calgary 
School of Public Policy Research Papers series, entitled ‘How You Pay Determines What 
You Get: Alternative Financing Options as a Determinant of Publicly Funded Health Care in 
Canada.’  In this article, Kneebone suggests that because Canadian citizens do not pay for 
their medical care out of pocket, and furthermore have difficulty understanding precisely how 
much they pay in taxes toward specific programs (e.g. Medicare), there is a systematic 
tendency for them to underestimate the true cost of health care in Canada.110  Therefore, 
Kneebone argues, they will not play the ‘traditional role of consumers’ by ‘guarding against 
waste and inefficiency’ and by that means contributing to ‘a more efficient and effective 
publicly-funded health care system.’  He terms this phenomenon of citizen 
misunderstanding/confusion the fiscal illusion.111   
 According to Kneebone, a fiscal illusion arises when there is a gap between the 
expenditures of a government and the amount of taxes paid by its ‘voter-taxpayers.’  This gap 
must then be subsequently filled by sources of revenue other than that of direct taxation of 
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those voters, thus contributing to their perception that they are receiving a service (in this 
case, medical care) at little to no, or at least lower, cost to themselves.112  Intergovernmental 
transfers are the most serious contributors to the fiscal illusion in Kneebone’s view.  He 
argues that federal transfer payments to provincial governments clearly reduce the price that 
provincial taxpayers perceive that they pay for health, for the obvious reasons that part of the 
tax revenues funding these transfers are collected from taxpayers across Canada – provincial 
government spending therefore appears to be cheaper to provincial taxpayers since ‘others’ 
are covering some fraction of the cost.113  Kneebone’s ultimate conclusion is that what is 
really needed, in light of his findings, is for provincial governments to face tighter budget 
constraints.  Once this is the case and provincial voters are able to clearly perceive the true 
costs of health care without the effect of the fiscal illusion caused by federal transfers, then 
these voters will act as a brake on provincial spending and force increased efficiency and 
effectiveness into the system. 
 The other half of the picture is provided by Ken Boessenkool in his ‘Fixing the Fiscal 
Imbalance’ article.  Boessenkool continues certain threads from Kneebone’s article, while 
expanding Kneebone’s primarily economic arguments to encompass other facets which he 
feels strongly point towards the best solution for Canadian health care being an enhanced 
provincial role and a greatly diminished or perhaps even completely absent federal role. 
 The arguments underlying Boessenkool’s proposal for a final transfer of an entire tax 
field to the provinces can be summarised in his own phrase – better alignment of provincial 
spending responsibilities and provincial revenues.114  He begins his rationale for 
decentralisation by putting forward the perennial issue of the ‘fiscal imbalance’ in Canada.  
This refers to the idea that at current tax rates, the federal government has substantially more 
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revenue than it needs to meet its expenditure responsibilities; meanwhile, the provinces, as a 
group, have less, and in some cases, substantially less, than they need to meet their 
expenditure responsibilities.115  Canada, Boessenkool says, ‘has closed the resulting gap by 
converting large amounts of federal revenues to provincial revenues through 
intergovernmental transfers.’116  Regarding the magnitude of the ‘fiscal imbalance,’ 
Boessenkool cites the findings of the 2002 report of Québec’s Séguin Commission on the 
Fiscal Imbalance, which stated that ‘For Canada as a whole, the need for resources that the 
Commission has quantified implies that the provinces should receive an adjustment to their 
financial resources of at least $8 billion in the short term.’117  He continues, ‘Given that 
federal transfers for social programs (not including the federal equalization program) 
increased from just over $19 billion in 2002-2004 to nearly $35 billion in 2009-2010, this 
condition has clearly been satisfied.’118 
 For Boessenkool, equalising federal transfers to provide joint federal-provincial 
programs is, as he terms it, not a ‘cure’ but instead a ‘treatment of symptoms.’119  He believes 
that these federal transfers are a negative aspect of the Canadian federal system, stating that 
‘Growing federal transfers set the stage for perpetual fiscal imbalances and continuing 
political instability [emphasis added].’120  Reinforcing his negative view of this practice, 
Boessenkool labels this facet of federal-provincial intergovernmental relations in Canada as 
transfer games:   
Under our current system, the fiscal gap between Ottawa is large and persistent.  Currently the federal 
government raises some $50 billion in taxes each year that it simply transfers to the provinces.  The 
result is what can only be described as Canada’s ‘co-dependent’ constitutional relations…Ottawa 
raises the money and the provinces spend it.  The result of this fiscal churning is that no government 
has clear responsibility for delivering key programs and both sides readily blame the other when 
something goes wrong.121 
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 This forms the nucleus of Boessenkool’s opposition to a continued federal role in the 
field of health care.  He rejects the traditional view of a federal government which does good 
by actively involving itself in the funding and regulation of Medicare in favour of a view that 
federal transfers to fund health and social programs are instead themselves encouraging a 
‘dysfunction’ in the federation, with negative consequences for its effective functioning as 
well as for the health care system being the result.  He labels the exercise in 
intergovernmental relations implicit in the CHT and CST transfer games because he sees the 
federal government and the provinces continually engaging in a negative and unproductive 
back-and-forth blame-shifting exercise; and it is clear that he believes that the impetus to that 
behaviour is inherent in the way that federalism itself is structured and has developed in 
Canada (i.e. a system of transfers between the two orders of government funding joint 
federal-provincial programs).    
Central to the concerns of Boessenkool and the decentralists is the fact that both the 
federal and provincial governments have a role in health care, which in their view translates 
to neither being held properly to account by the electorate for health outcomes, since the 
electorate is unsure where to place blame for unsatisfactory health outcomes.  The 
consequence of this, decentralists believe, is that provinces have no impetus to control their 
health care spending and to find efficiencies.  Instead of being forced to raise taxes to meet 
these expanding expenditures and facing the ire of their own voters for that decision, the 
provinces instead are content to argue for and spend the dollars raised nationally via taxation 
which are then transferred to them.  ‘When the premiers call for more federal transfers, they 
pretend this could be done without increasing the federal tax and debt burden on their own 
citizens.  Naturally, the premiers would like to spend more without raising taxes themselves.  
It is only the current system of murky shared responsibility that makes this seem like more 
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than a pipe dream [i.e. the fiscal illusion].’122  Provinces, Boessenkool argues, are loathe to 
bring order to their own fiscal houses because that weakens their case for increasing or 
continuing federal transfers.  So long as the option to argue for increased transfers exists, 
provinces have no incentive to embark down the difficult and potentially politically 
dangerous road to reform.123  For its part, the federal government has little incentive to 
encourage reform so long as voters seemingly reward it for doing nothing more than, in 
Boessenkool’s phrase, writing larger and larger cheques.124  It gets worse, however, because 
of what he terms the ‘common property resource’ problem: 
Of course, federal bailouts of provincial spending inevitably come at the expense of federal taxpayers 
– who are provincial taxpayers and voters as well.  Shouldn’t this eliminate incentives for the 
provinces to attempt to finance provincial spending with federal revenues?  Not in the current 
environment, given the extent to which federal transfers are disproportionately borne by more 
wealthy taxpayers who reside in greater numbers in a few provinces…and the evidence that each 
province may obtain its own deal from Ottawa through bilateral negotiation.  In these circumstances, 
federal tax revenues are in effect a common pool of resources that is available to whoever is the first 
to exploit them.  Like all poorly managed common property resources, the result is an inevitable 
tendency to exploitation.  We end up with a race among provincial governments to exploit taxpayers 
who reside in other provinces through federal transfer negotiations.125   
 
Lastly, Boessenkool states that ‘the critical point is that, in the absence of clean lines 
of accountability in tax and spending decisions, the current policy stance of both federal and 
provincial governments is self-reinforcing: Canada is stuck in a sort of low-level 
intergovernmental fiscal equilibrium.’126  This is the case despite the fact that the federal 
government has clearly been unable/unwilling to commit to a clear, consistent, and stable 
system of transfers for health care funding.  Federal transfer funding levels have varied 
wildly from the nadir of the 1990s, when the federal government severely constrained 
spending due to the prevailing fiscal climate, to the rapid expansion of unconditional federal 
transfers following Martin’s 2004 ‘Fix for a Generation.’  It is clear that reform is needed – 
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the question becomes, as Boessenkool acknowledges, how can reform be achieved without 
wrecking Canada’s sometimes precarious regional and political equilibrium?127 
 Boessenkool argues that his GST tax-transfer proposal provides such a solution.  It 
would at a stroke end the ‘blame game’ of shifting responsibility between the federal and 
provincial governments in the field of health care, and the seemingly endless battles implied 
in the continuing need for renegotiation of the federal transfer arrangements.128  This in turn 
would mean an end to the fiscal illusion for provincial voters; no longer would provincial 
premiers be able to issue never-ending calls for more federal dollars, pretending, as 
Boessenkool puts it, that this could be done without increasing the tax burden on those same 
voter-taxpayers, who of course are simultaneously federal voters and taxpayers.   
The provinces would obtain access to a large, comparatively stable tax field where the 
growth trajectory in terms of the amount of funds collected has been steadily upward over 
time, suffering none of the uncertainties that are associated either with the CHT or with the 
income tax route, since consumption is less variable than income (whether personal or 
corporate), and since the provincial fiscal capacity for the GST varies less than that for 
personal income taxes.129  The result would be the provision of more stability over time to 
provincial budgets.130  He also makes a more ideological argument, stating that ‘given that 
the provinces have exclusive responsibilities; they should be matched with tax bases that are 
exclusively in their jurisdiction.’131  From a provincial perspective, however, the rationale for 
the GST tax-point transfer does not end at a view of constitutional provincial primacy (or 
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even exclusive jurisdiction) in health care.  The provinces also face the prospect that federal 
transfers (including those for health) have more than likely reached the top of their cycle for 
the foreseeable future.132  With the economic outlook gloomy, the provinces should, in 
Boessenkool’s view, recognise that transfers such as the CHT are likely to move in only one 
direction – down – and take the opportunity to ‘lock in’ their gains with a permanent tax-
point transfer.133  From the point of view of the federal government, the supporting rationale 
for an end to its role in health care through a tax point transfer is obvious: immediately it 
limits any future growth in transfers which it can be held to. More indirectly, it would mean 
that federal dollars transferred for health would no longer seem in the eyes of the taxpayer to 
vanish into thin air due to the unclear lines of accountability in the present health care 
funding regime.134     
To summarise, Boessenkool believes his GST tax-point transfer is the right solution 
for Canada and the Canadian federation.  In one fell swoop, it would end the fiscal illusion on 
the part of voters, allowing them to see the true price of health care in Canada, which is 
currently obscured by the byzantine joint-funding federal-provincial transfer system under the 
CHT.  The provinces would gain a stable revenue source, free of any fear of sudden 
withdrawal of federal largesse.  At the same time, they will be forced to work within hard 
budget constraints imposed by their need to ask their voters for money to spend on health 
care directly.  Reform would be the likely result as provinces finally have an incentive to face 
the problems that, under the current system, they are content to let rest unaddressed.135  This, 
in turn, would likely spur innovation as the provinces try to find a way to maximise 
efficiency and positive outcomes in their individual health care systems; under the GST tax-
transfer, with Ottawa effectively out of the picture, they would be free of the limitations of 
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the Canada Health Act, which the decentralists see as potentially stifling needed 
innovation.136  For its part, with the onerous burden of funding transfers for health and social 
programs largely removed, the federal government would be disencumbered of the need for 
protracted and painful intergovernmental negotiations and free to concentrate on what 
decentralists such as Boessenkool see as properly national concerns: defence, international 
trade, etc.  The result, in the decentralist view, is a more efficient, effective, rationally 
structured federal system, one with strong incentives to address the identified shortcomings in 
Canada’s health care system.   
3.3 Application & Implications - Open Federalism & ‘The Harper Doctrine’  
 
That Boessenkool’s ideas on health care funding and reform were percolating in the 
Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) caucus is evidenced by the fact that, shortly before his 
‘Fixing the Fiscal Imbalance’ article was published in autumn 2010, Maxime Bernier, then 
federal Minister of State for Small Business & Tourism, spoke frankly during a luncheon 
speech at Toronto’s Albany Club of the possibility of the then-Conservative government 
replacing the Canada Health Transfer with a one-time tax transfer, and leaving health care as 
an exclusive provincial responsibility.137   
There is clear evidence that when the Conservative Party came to power in January 
2006 with Stephen Harper as Prime Minister, it did so with a party upper echelon which had 
some very definite ideas about Canadian federalism and the proper structure and operation of 
the Canadian federation.  Harper labelled his new vision for the Canadian federation ‘open 
federalism.’  Understanding, as far as possible, what ‘open federalism’ is, and more 
importantly what it means, is vital in order to analyse the impact of decentralist ideas on the 
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trajectory of the last government’s policies towards federalism and health care more 
specifically. 
The first indication of Harper’s vision for Canadian federalism came in a letter to 
former Alberta Premier Ralph Klein, which appeared in the Jan. 24, 2001 edition of the 
National Post as ‘An open letter to Ralph Klein.’  The letter was signed by Mr. Harper as 
President of the National Citizens’ Coalition, and five other ‘academic and political right-
wingers:’138 Tom Flanagan, Ted Morton, Rainer Knopff, Andrew Crooks, and Ken 
Boessenkool.139  In this letter, Harper and his compatriots excoriated the federal Liberal 
government for their ‘attack on Alberta’s health care system,’140 stating that it was time for 
Alberta to ‘resume control of the powers that we possess under the constitution of Canada but 
that we have allowed the federal government to exercise.’141  Intelligent use of these powers, 
they continued, would help Alberta build a prosperous future in spite of the attempted 
intrusions into provincial jurisdiction by a ‘misguided and increasingly hostile federal 
government.’142  The comments of the letter on the health care file, in particular, are worth 
quoting at length here: 
…Resume provincial responsibility for health-care policy. If Ottawa objects to provincial policy, 
fight in the courts. If we lose, we can afford the financial penalties that Ottawa may try to impose 
under the Canada Health Act. Albertans deserve better than the long waiting periods and 
technological backwardness that are rapidly coming to characterize Canadian medicine. Alberta 
should also argue that each province should raise its own revenue for health care – i.e., replace 
Canada Health and Social Transfer cash with tax points as Quebec has argued for many years. Poorer 
provinces would continue to rely on Equalization to ensure they have adequate revenues.143 
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Also relevant were their comments on equalisation, best captured via direct quotation, and the 
letter’s closing paragraph: 
In addition, we believe it is imperative for you to take all possible political and legal measures to 
reduce the financial drain on Alberta caused by Canada’s tax-and-transfer system. The most recent 
Alberta Treasury estimates are that Albertans transfer $2,600 per capita annually to other Canadians, 
for a total outflow from our province approaching $8 billion a year. The same federal politicians who 
accuse us of not sharing their “Canadian values” have no compunction about appropriating our 
Canadian dollars to buy votes elsewhere in the country…The precondition for the success of this 
Alberta Agenda is the exercise of all our legitimate provincial jurisdictions under the constitution of 
Canada.144 
 
 Clear from the above is that Harper and his associates had some definite visions about 
federalism which were radically different from those which were prevailing at the time.  In 
particular, one notes that they clearly view health care as a matter of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction.  Also noteworthy is their harsh condemnation of the principles of equalisation 
and their suggestion that the relevant ‘sharing community,’ for Alberta anyway, is not pan-
Canadian, but intra-Albertan.  And one cannot help but note the language used to describe the 
role of the federal government – ‘misguided’ and ‘increasingly hostile’ are the terms used to 
describe a federal government which sees itself as having a role in health and social policy.  
In the 1937 Labour Relations case,145 which pre-dated the rise of the Canadian welfare state, 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s (JCPC) Lord Atkin put forth the famous 
‘watertight compartments’ interpretation of Canadian federalism when he said: ‘While the 
ship of state now sails on larger ventures…she still retains the watertight compartments 
which are essential to her original structure.’146  As Errol P. Mendes notes, this early 
restrictive interpretation, which did not anticipate the vast expansion of both federal and 
provincial responsibilities occasioned by the rise of the welfare state, and militated against 
any intrusion by one level of government into the jurisdiction of another, seems to have found 
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its resurrection in the 2001 letter.   ‘Harper’s rhetoric is the modern-day equivalent of Lord 
Atkin’s naval metaphor,’ Mendes asserts – the language may have changed from ‘waterproof 
compartment’ to ‘firewall’ – but the effective meaning would seem to be the same.147  
 The next piece of the puzzle to understanding what ‘open federalism’ is and its 
implications for the Canadian federation (and for health care) fell into place in a Dec. 2005 
speech by Harper in Québec City.  In it, he condemned previous Liberal governments for 
their use of the federal spending power, stating that ‘this outrageous spending power gave 
rise to a domineering and paternalistic federalism.’148  In addition, Harper, if he became 
Prime Minister, promised to:  
• Develop mechanisms to give the provinces a greater role in their own 
jurisdictions in the international arena; 
• Recognise and respect provincial autonomy; 
• Respect federal and provincial jurisdictions, and  
• To curb the use of the ‘outrageous’ federal spending power.149   
This speech clearly reflected its venue, with Harper making generous references to the unique 
social and cultural responsibilities of the Québec government, and promising to act in ways 
that reflected Québec’s severe antipathy to the use of the federal spending power and federal 
intrusion into what Québec viewed as areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.  By 
implication, Harper clearly embraced asymmetry – the idea that some provinces might rightly 
have responsibilities and exercise powers which others might not – as part of his vision of 
federalism.150   
 On January 13, 2006, Harper wrote a letter to the Council of the Federation, saying 
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‘It is my hope as Prime Minister to initiate a new style of open federalism,’ which would, he 
said, have the following three features:  
• Working more closely and collaboratively with the provinces and the 
Council of the Federation to develop Canada’s economic and social union; 
• Clarification of appropriate federal and provincial policy responsibilities; 
• Acknowledgement of the existence of a Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI) in 
Canada, and a commitment to resolving the fiscal imbalance between the 
federal and provincial-territorial orders of government.151   
 In the same vein, in its 2006 election platform, Stand Up for Canada, the 
Conservatives promised that a ‘Conservative government will support the creation of 
practical intergovernmental mechanisms to facilitate provincial involvement in areas of 
federal jurisdiction where provincial jurisdiction is affected, and enshrine these practices in a 
‘Charter of Open Federalism.’152  However, during the election campaign the Conservatives 
placed by far the greatest emphasis on enhancing the policy role of the provinces – little if 
any attention was paid to seeking the collaboration of the provincial governments in a joint 
endeavour with Ottawa to achieve national goals in areas where federal powers were not, in 
themselves, adequate to the task.153   
Although there was no unilateral federal withdrawal from the health care field of the 
sort envisioned by Boessenkool during the term of the last Conservative government, there is 
nevertheless evidence that Harper chose a subtler way to implement his particular vision of 
Canadian federalism.  Already in 2008, Errol P. Mendes first suggested this in his chapter in 
the State of the Federation 2008 volume: 
Prime Minister Harper claims that he is determined to end what he terms the “domineering and 
paternalistic federalism”…of the previous government and promote…severe restrictions on federal 
spending on areas of provincial jurisdiction.  While the Harper government has not publicly 
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articulated how it intends to proceed with this agenda, it may be by slowly suffocating the spending 
power by making sure that there is very little money to spend.154 
 
 This assertion is supported by the statements of Tom Flanagan, who was quoted in the 
media as stating that ‘tightening the screws’ on the federal government would leave more 
money in the taxpayer’s pocket and make it harder for the government to spend.155  This 
agenda, points out Mendes, while left unspoken by Mr. Harper himself, was furthered by a 
series of budgets in which the federal government significantly increased spending in areas of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as defence, while simultaneously slashing the federal 
government’s capacity to raise revenue.156   
Within its first two years in government, the Conservative Party cut the federal GST 
by two percentage points – a move that, by itself, denied the federal coffers some $11 billion 
annually – close to $60 billion over a five-year period.157  Corporate and income tax cuts, 
new tax credits, and the new tax-sheltered savings account brought in by the Conservative 
government further emptied the federal purse.158  Flanagan expressed his considerable 
satisfaction with these developments in a 2008 article, stating that through this dismantling of 
the federal revenue capacity, the Harper government has ‘gradually re-engineered the 
system.’159  He continued: 
I’m quite impressed with it…they’re boxing in the ability of the federal government to come up with 
new program ideas…The federal government is now more constrained, the provinces have more 
revenue, and conservatives should be happy.160      
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 A final piece of the puzzle can be found in a letter published by Mr. Harper entitled 
‘My Plan for Open Federalism,’ published in the Oct. 27, 2004 edition of the National Post.  
In this letter, Harper unequivocally stated that ‘Conservatives seek to re-establish a strong 
central government that focuses on genuine national priorities like national defence and the 
economic union, while fully respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces [emphases 
added].’161  Tellingly, no mention is made of health and social programs, traditionally the 
largest single areas of federal spending.  This direct quote from Mr. Harper’s letter perhaps 
more than any other allows one to capture and summarise the essence of open federalism: it is 
in a sense, it appears, a compartmentalised federalism, in which the provinces stick to 
provincial responsibilities (which clearly includes health and social programs), and the 
federal government tends to national priorities such as defence and the economy.   
 Against the backdrop of this steady contraction of federal revenue sources, there was 
also a refusal by Harper to personally engage with provincial leaders throughout his tenure, 
coupled with the events of December 2011 referenced in the opening of this thesis.  Early on, 
academics formed the impression that Harper’s ‘open federalism’ rhetoric about 
‘collaboration and cooperation with the provinces’ might imply a new, more engaged 
relationship between the two orders of government.  The events in Victoria sharply belied 
that interpretation, with then-Finance Minister Flaherty unilaterally springing upon the 
unsuspecting provinces a new funding structure for Canadian health care.  There was no 
collaboration and certainly not any consultation.  The effects of the new arrangements were 
to be as follows: 
• The six per cent per annum escalator clause for the CHT put in place by 
the 2004 Health Accord (PM Martin’s so-called ‘Fix for a Generation’) 
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would be continued until 2016-17, at which time the terms of that Accord 
would end. 
• Going forward from 2016-17, rather than a fixed six per cent escalator 
clause, the CHT would instead grow in line with a three-year moving 
average of nominal GDP growth, with a minimum ‘floor’ of three per cent 
growth per annum guaranteed. 
• The transfers would be unconditional. 
• The CST would continue to grow at three per cent annually.162 
 The Parliamentary Budget Office analysed the effects of these changes in its 2012 
Fiscal Sustainability Report.  According the PBO’s predictions, nominal GDP would likely 
average 3.7 per cent annually from 2017-2024, which corresponded to 3.9 per cent growth 
based on a three-year moving average over the period 2017-18 to 2024-25.  To put this into 
meaningful terms, this meant that in the PBO’s Fiscal Sustainability Report 2011, when the 
6-per cent per annum escalator was assumed to be in effect, federal CHT cash was projected 
to average 21.6 per cent of provincial-territorial health spending over 2011-12 to 2035-36.163  
In contrast, under the new formula, that figure dropped to an average of 18.6 per cent from 
2011-12 to 2035-36 – a decline of three per cent.164  In any case, the 3.9 per cent annual 
escalator was well below the PBO’s projections for the growth in provincial-territorial health 
expenditures, which were predicted to increase 5.1 per cent year over year.165  As the report 
states, therefore, ‘the projected increase in consolidated program spending relative to the size 
of the economy – resulting from population ageing and assumed program enrichment – now 
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falls squarely on provincial and territorial governments’166 – already by far the more ‘fiscally 
challenged’ order of government.167  In other words the Harper government’s transfer 
arrangements regime, implemented unilaterally without any input by the provinces, 
significantly decreased the federal government’s commitments to funding health care, and 
offloaded this burden primarily onto the provinces. 
 Bringing together all of the foregoing, it would appear that the Harper government, in 
addition to its stated positions on the issue, did in fact have a differing vision of federalism 
than previous governments.  It now appears that ‘open federalism’ should be primarily 
understood as a classical variant of federalism in which the federal government focusses on 
clearly federal responsibilities such as defence and the economic union, and distinctly steps 
away from involvement in the health and social arena.  This accords both with statements by 
Mr. Harper and others in the Conservative camp, and with the evidence of what happened in 
Victoria regarding the implementation of a new health care funding regime, one which 
significantly reduced the fiscal burden on the federal government even as it would have the 
effect of ‘putting the screws to’ the fiscally challenged provinces, presumably forcing them to 
innovate and find efficiencies in their delivery of health services.  As Mr. Flanagan has 
essentially said, public opinion may have prevented the kind of abrupt federal withdrawal 
envisioned by Boessenkool in his tax-points transfer proposal – but it seems that the Harper 
government may well have been aiming at similar decentralising objectives in the field of 
health and social policy, just by more gradual and less dramatic means. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter examined some of the tenets of the decentralist school of thought and its 
proposals for the direction for health care in Canada moving forward.  Essentially, the 
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decentralist school asserts that the manner in which health care is structured and paid for in 
Canada encourages a fiscal illusion wherein provincial taxpayers systematically 
underestimate the true cost of health care in Canada.  In other words, the system of federal 
transfers for health creates a situation where provinces spend more profligately than they 
would if they had to fund their health expenditures from own-source revenue, and where they 
have little to no incentive to undertake needed reform to the system.  For this reason, the 
current regime is not a desirable way to structure the federation.  In place of this structure, the 
decentralists propose that the best course of action is for the federal government to get out of 
the business of health care entirely, and transfer a robust tax field, such as the GST, to the 
provinces.  This would allow the provinces to set their own fiscal priorities, protect them 
from the vagaries of federal transfer arrangements, reduce intergovernmental friction, clarify 
policy roles and areas of authority, foster innovation and reform by forcing provincial 
governments to face tighter budget constraints, and allow the Canadian electorate to more 
clearly hold their governments to account for health outcomes. 
 Secondly, this chapter provided an analysis of the record of the last Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper in light of the tenets of the decentralist school.  It does 
strongly appear based upon available evidence that the Harper government inclined and took 
steps toward implementing a classical view of Canadian federalism, one in which health and 
social policy are areas of provincial authority and responsibility with which the federal 
government wishes to minimise its involvement, freeing it to concentrate on what are seen in 
this conception to be truly properly national and federal concerns: trade, international 
relations, the economy, and defence, to name the salient policy sectors.   
This conclusion is based not only on explicit statements by Harper, former ministers 
of the Conservative caucus, and conservatives such as Tom Flanagan; but also on the 
decision of the Harper government to slash its revenue sources while strongly expanding 
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spending in areas of federal authority, while in effect, without consultation halving its 
contribution to Canada’s largest social program – health care – and, in the words of the 
PBO’s report, off-loading that burden on to the provinces, which are already fiscally over-
burdened.  It is assumed that this was intended to have the dual function of allowing the 
federal government to operate more freely within its sphere of strict constitutional 
competence, while also simultaneously satisfying the decentralist objective of both clarifying 
policy roles and responsibilities and ‘tightening the screws’ on the other order of government, 
weaning the provinces off federal transfers and forcing them into innovation and reform of 
their individual health care systems.  It is therefore the tentative conclusion of this chapter 
that the ideological position of the recent Conservative government was indeed a decentralist 
classical federalist one, and that while public opinion considerations may have prevented the 
sort of dramatic decentralist solution that Boessenkool proposed from being implemented, it 
is a distinct possibility that Harper simply took a more subtle, indirect route over a long time 
frame to accomplish what would amount to the achievement of many of the same goals 
which Boessenkool and the decentralist school identified as central to the reforms which in 
their view are needed in the Canadian health care system. 
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Chapter 4 – Proposals for Future Directions: The Centralist School 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
  This chapter will examine the second broad normative vision for renovating the 
Canadian health care house for the 21st century: the centralist vision.  It commences with an 
examination of the basic theoretical underpinnings of the centralist school, then proceeds to 
examine the vision which centralists hold for Canadian federalism and the Canadian 
federation in terms of intergovernmental relations, and for the structure of Medicare 
specifically within the context of the federation.  It concludes with some observations about 
the implications of this vision, and the importance which centralists feel it holds not only for 
the future of the Canadian heath care system, but for the Canadian federation and the broader 
notion of a common Canadian identity and citizenship. 
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings – Health Care, System Renewal, and a National Vision 
 
 To comprehend the centralist position with respect to health care, a starting point can 
be found in the most comprehensive expression of its key tenets to date: the 
recommendations contained in the Final Report of the 2002 Royal Commission on the Future 
of Health Care in Canada, entitled Building on Values.  Out of the Commission’s research 
programme emerged forty-seven recommendations across eleven broad thematic areas.  Of 
these, four are of particular significance to the present analysis: 
1. Vision and Direction 
a. Establish a new Canadian Health Covenant as a tangible statement of 
Canadians’ values and a guiding force for the Canadian publicly-funded health 
care system.  This should clearly outline the collective vision for the future of 
health care in Canada, and the responsibilities and entitlements of individual 
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Canadians, health providers, and orders of government in regard to the 
system.168 
b. Create a Health Council of Canada to facilitate cooperation and provide 
national leadership in health among the provinces, territories, and the federal 
government, by setting common indicators and benchmarks and measuring 
and tracking the performance of the health system.169 
2. The Canada Health Act  
a. Renew, strengthen, and clarify the five existing principles of the CHA by: 
i. Confirming the principles of public administration, universality, and 
accessibility.170 
ii. Enhancing and strengthening the principles of portability and 
comprehensiveness.171  
b. Establish a new principle of accountability, which will confirm the importance 
of accountability to the Canadian citizenry for health outcomes and the 
operation of the system; and confirm that all orders of government have a 
collective responsibility to: clarify the roles and responsibilities of each of 
them, establish harmonious intergovernmental processes, and put in place 
adequate, stable, and predictable funding mechanisms.172   
c. The ‘basket’ of insured CHA services (which currently covers ‘medically 
necessary hospital and physician services’) should be reviewed and expanded 
to reflect the realities of 21st century medicine as this becomes fiscally 
feasible, but as a start: 
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i. Revise the CHA to include coverage for medically necessary home 
care services in the areas of home mental case management and 
intervention services, post-acute home care, and palliative home 
care.173   
3. Health Care Funding 
a. The federal government must provide stable, predictable, and long-term 
funding via a new dedicated transfer for Medicare, established as part of a 
revamped Canada Health Act, with the federal government contributing a 
large enough share to have a reasonable claim to a stake in the system.174  To 
enhance predictability and stability, this transfer is to have an escalator 
provision, set in advance for five years, commensurate with economic 
growth.175   
b. This federal funding will be targeted and conditional in order to galvanise 
systemic renewal and change, focussing in particular on five priority areas, in 
which provinces will be required to match if not exceed the federal financial 
contribution:  
i. Rural and Remote Access; 
ii. Diagnostic Services; 
iii. Primary Health Care; 
iv. Home Care; 
v. Catastrophic Drug Coverage.176 
4. Pharmacare 
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a. Use the newly created Catastrophic Drug Transfer, item 3(b.)(v.) above, to 
offset the cost of provincial and territorial drug plans and thereby reduce 
serious inter-regional disparities in terms of catastrophic drug coverage; and to 
encourage the provinces to expand their catastrophic drug coverage.177 
b. Establish a new National Drug Agency to evaluate new and existing drugs, 
with a national formulary of prescription drugs to provide consistency across 
the country, ensure objective assessments of drugs, and contain costs.  This 
would replace the current system under which every province and territory has 
its own list of prescription drugs which are covered (or not) under its 
respective provincial drug insurance plan.178  
First and foremost, it is impossible to miss the emphasis on the central role played by 
the federal government.  Each one of the Royal Commission’s recommendations in one way 
or another strongly implicates the federal government.  What is clear is that the federal 
government is not only to have a role, but a role greater, nor lesser, than what it has played in 
the field of health care during roughly the past two decades in particular – a position which 
stands in marked contrast to the decentralist vision.   
Clearly implied by the scale and structure of the recommendations was the 
Commission’s concern that action be taken to bring about substantive renovation and reform 
to Canada’s health care system, a point on which it agreed with the voices of decentralists.  
The problem faced by centralists is that those defending an enhanced federal role are 
perceived as doing so on the basis of the past, while the future is perceived to belong to those 
arguing in favour of a more vigorous role for the provinces.179  In the view of centralists, 
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however, a return to the past – or at least, to a version of past arrangements, slightly modified 
and updated to reflect the natural evolution of the health care system – is precisely what is 
needed to ensure the continued well-being of Canadian Medicare.  Centralists view a 
resurgent federal government – one that is a true partner in the Medicare enterprise – as the 
central plank of their ideology and vision for Canadian health care in the 21st century. 
This is undergirded by two lines of reasoning.  The first is purely practical.  Providing 
health care in a 21st century world is an enterprise vastly more complicated, technical, and 
far-reaching than the framers of the British North America Act, 1867 could ever have 
possibly imagined.  As such, in the centralist view, decentralist arguments about a return to 
watertight compartments and/or to a more original or faithful interpretation of the Canadian 
Constitution (which would move health care to exclusive provincial jurisdiction) are not only 
sterile, but fundamentally unhelpful.  In the centralist view, the idea that health care is 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction is not only incorrect from the point of view of constitutional 
interpretation, it would be difficult if not impossible to achieve given the way the health care 
system has developed over time.  Canadian Medicare is not merely a product of dry by-the-
letter constitutional interpretation but is an organic entity that has developed along a unique 
trajectory over time as a complicated and involved intergovernmental partnership in response 
to political and social needs and considerations.  Centralists stress the need to remember this 
fact and to not reduce debates surrounding Medicare to issues of dry constitutional 
interpretation. 
However, there is, in the view of centralists, a larger issue in play.  While rejecting 
arguments of constitutional interpretation and compartmentalisation of constitutional 
responsibilities in favour of viewing health care as a dynamic, engaged intergovernmental 
partnership which has grown up over time, centralists also believe that the federal 
government has an indispensable role to play in the health care enterprise.  Marchildon 
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provided a nuanced examination of this issue by dividing his analysis of the matter by 
looking at the facets of Medicare not only from a purely public policy standpoint, but also 
from a broader perspective.  In a 2012 interview, Marchildon expressed his centralist views in 
this way: 
I would view my perspective as one between those two extremes [decentralism/open federalism and 
extreme federalist-centralism], where I feel that the federal government should be involved in certain 
areas, and in other areas, the provinces both constitutionally and from a perspective of public 
administration are better suited to doing certain things.   And in other areas, the federal government 
has a constitutional foothold and because it’s the national government it’s in a better position to do 
certain things.  And there are times where even though one or the other order of government is doing 
the heavy lifting, that they still need to work together in an intergovernmental way to make the 
system work effectively and an example of that is in fact in the area of Medicare, universally insured 
hospital and physician services, where the provinces do the heavy lifting but the broad national 
standards if you like are set by the federal government.180 
 
 In other words, Canada’s health care system as currently constituted actually strikes a 
good balance and represents an effective partnership.  In the centralist view, there is no need 
for decentralisation because all the day-to-day particulars are in fact already in the hands of 
the provinces.  It is the provinces, not Ottawa, which have individual authority and which 
daily administer and run their thirteen separate health and drug insurance programs.  They 
individually decide which specific hospital and physician services and drugs will or will not 
be covered under the auspices of those plans, for example.  As the previous chapter set forth, 
one of the major arguments which decentralists employ in advocating that authority and 
control over health care ought to be passed exclusively to the provinces is that the federal role 
as currently constituted stifles innovation and prevents meaningful reform to the program.  In 
the decentralist view, the Canada Health Act and the federal role is a negative and limiting 
one, shackling the provinces who, without these restraints, would implement appropriate 
reforms.  Centralists reject the arguments of Boessenkool and others that the CHA and the 
federal role are stifling and limiting to the provinces.  Again, the remarks of Marchildon are 
apropos: 
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I cannot possibly see how five high-level conditions which [as things stand at present] are [and have 
been] barely enforced [by the federal government under the auspices of the CHA] impede any kind of 
innovation.  What they do impede is governments from getting rid of universal health care.  So to that 
extent, if that’s your target, innovation in the sense of allowing private insurers and private funding to 
replace public funding, then yes it does [stifle innovation]; but outside of that it doesn’t prevent any 
innovation whatsoever.  There’s no rule on delivery, there’s hardly anything on the way in which you 
administer the system – so it’s open book what you do as a province.181 
 
 Indeed, even though it is true that the CHT is technically speaking a conditional 
federal transfer, and the CHA technically empowers the federal government to enforce all of 
its five conditions by withdrawing CHT funds for any violation of any of the five principles, 
in fact (other than in the earliest beginnings) the federal government has never engaged in a 
minute or even particularly thoroughgoing regulation of the delivery and administration of 
Canadian health care, only ever concerning itself with enforcing the terms of the CHA – and 
then only in the case of very egregious transgressions such as those which were represented 
by extra-billing and user fees.  The individual provinces have generally been left to their own 
devices as far as the day-to-day regulation and administration of Medicare is concerned. 
Centralists believe that Boessenkool and others in the decentralist camp miss the mark 
in another, more critical respect: a failure to appreciate the larger picture.  It does not end at 
considering that either the provinces or the federal government might be better suited to look 
after certain aspects of the Medicare system.  What the 2002 Royal Commission on Health 
Care clearly implied, and Marchildon explicitly states, is that there are certain aspects of the 
Canadian health care system which centralists believe only the federal government is in a 
position to ensure.  Thus, a continued and indeed a renewed federal presence in the health 
care field is not only to be welcomed and encouraged, it is necessary to the very well-being of 
the Canadian health care system. 
This is why, above all, centralists reject the prescription put forward by Boessenkool 
and others in the decentralist camp as not just wrong-headed in terms of their suggestions for 
reform and the rationale underlying them, but a potential disaster for universal health care as 
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it currently exists.  That this should be so is because like decentralists, centralists believe that 
a major determinant of how the Canadian health care system will function in terms of 
intergovernmental and fiscal relations is the incentives which the structure of the system 
present to the various actors who have a stake in that system, principally the two orders of 
government: federal and provincial-territorial.  Centralists believe that the proposal to further 
decentralise Canadian health care and place exclusive responsibility for this social field into 
the hands of the provinces will create negative incentives which will have a detrimental 
impact on the health care system as a whole. 
It is easy to identify examples of how the Canadian health care system functions as a 
system largely because of the influence of incentives.  For instance, in the beginning, Ottawa 
used the offer of 50-50 cost-sharing of provinces’ hospital and later health care costs 
(according to a mutually agreed-upon framework) to entice the subnational governments to 
buy into a broadly national health care project, an offer the provinces each individually found 
too good to refuse.  Similarly, when Established Programs Financing (EPF) was put in place, 
some provinces responded to the freer hand they perceived this gave them by instituting 
extra-billing and user fees.  Finally, when in response the federal government moved to 
position itself as the guardian of what were broadly conceived to be Canadian values of 
equality, it did so by using its discretion under the spending power to withhold federal funds 
from provinces which allowed extra-billing and user fees within their jurisdictions.  By this 
negative incentive, the provinces were compelled to return to a more equitable health care 
delivery model, free of any financial barriers to access.   
This last example is critical because it demonstrates the importance that the Canada 
Health Act and the federal government hold for centralists.  They reject the arguments of 
Boessenkool that even under his new tax-point transfer proposal, the federal government 
would still retain a form of transfer of equalising transfer of fiscal resources to the provinces.  
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Boessenkool confines himself to arguing that the provinces are clearly the best stewards of 
health care from the standpoint of fiscal responsibility and public policy, and therefore 
decentralisation is both necessary and desirable.  Left unsaid is the fact that under 
Boessenkool’s framework, the Canada Health Act would in all probability become a dead-
letter law.  The Act could not be of any meaningful effect if the provinces were given the 
ability to raise their own revenues sufficient to fund health care.  This would remove the 
entire public policy purpose of the Canada Health Transfer and render ineffective any 
exercise of the federal government’s spending power, i.e. withdrawal of federal transfer 
dollars to bring provinces into accord with the five CHA values.  Boessenkool’s insistence 
that the federal government would retain a transfer under his proposal is met with rejection 
by centralist proponents, because the transfer which Boessenkool envisioned would not be a 
conditional transfer, but merely an equalising transfer with no conditionality.  As Marchildon 
argues, this is not an equivalent situation.  Boessenkool’s model of health care funding retains 
a federal transfer, technically speaking, but it still results in a situation where the original 
public policy purpose of a federal transfer for health – namely, protection of the CHA 
principles – has been lost.  What then will protect the keystone values of universality, 
accessibility, portability, public administration, and comprehensiveness? 
For his part, Boessenkool does not directly address this centralist critique of 
decentralist proposals in his article.  A common decentralist counter-position however has 
been to argue that the conditionality of the Canada Health Act and its enforcement by the 
federal government is not only a negative influence, but actually unnecessary.  Marchildon 
summarised these decentralist assertions as follows: ‘…[A decentralist may argue that] the 
federal spending power in health care has outlived its early usefulness…Medicare is here to 
stay as an ‘established program,’ and provincial governments, irrespective of their ideological 
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proclivities, will be prevented by their own voters from subverting or eliminating the national 
dimensions of the system.’182   
Centralists take the opposite view: that it is perfectly possible that the provinces 
would not uphold the core values currently protected by the CHA legislation, largely because 
they would have little incentive to do so.  Centralists argue that the majority of the incentives 
for the provinces under the new arrangements would encourage the provinces to limit and 
perhaps even abrogate, not protect, strengthen, or progressively reform, the five core 
principles.  This, centralists suggest, would be a phenomenon which would occur across the 
subnational governments of the federation, both centre-left and centre-right – some would act 
out of ideological conviction, and others out of out of political or economic necessity.  Three 
of the five conditions, in particular, would be under immediate threat: portability, 
universality, and accessibility.  Marchildon identifies portability as the condition which 
would face the most imminent threat under a hypothetical tax-transfer arrangement such as 
that proposed by Boessenkool.  Already in 2001/2, the Royal Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada found that, while all provinces were meeting their obligation under the 
CHA to provide medically necessary hospital services to Canadians who move from province 
to province or to visitors from another province, not all provinces were covering medically 
necessary physician services, meaning that some people might still have to pay directly.183  In 
addition, five provinces, for ‘financial reasons,’ did not provide out-of-country coverage as 
required by the CHA at the time the Royal Commission published its report.184  Given that 
even with the Canada Health Act having been in force since 1984, a number of provinces 
have continuously failed to fully comply with the guarantees implied in the portability 
principle, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that absent any legislative protection, 
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further derogation of previously enjoyed health care portability rights across provinces would 
be the end result.  One need look no further for the type case for this sort of behaviour than 
Québec’s refusal to recognise portability for certain medical services, a decision to which 
Ontario reacted by retaliating in kind – and this while the Canada Health Act was in effect.185   
It is not difficult to imagine that provinces which for ideological and political reasons 
or for simple expediency decided not to honour their portability commitments for either 
hospital and/or physician services, would quickly cause other provinces – even those which 
might be ideologically inclined to preserve the traditional Medicare principles – to respond in 
kind.  It seems unrealistic to expect that a province would continue to provide portability 
benefits to the citizens of other provinces when they travel and/or move, if other provinces 
did not offer that same guarantee.  Even Saskatchewan, which had universal publicly-funded 
health insurance for years before the national Medicare program came into being, did not 
offer portability to its residents, simply because to do so would have required agreements 
with the other provinces, which had dissimilar (private) systems and thus had little to no 
interest in such a reciprocal arrangement; and even if they had, such an agreement would 
have been extremely difficult to negotiate.186  Only the advent of Medicare, spurred on by 
federal leadership and with provincial cooperation, created a situation where Canadians 
would come to enjoy portability of their insured health care benefits across provincial 
boundaries.  Absent that protection, which was later strengthened by the passing of the 
Canada Health Act, centralists assert that it would be more likely to see a situation more akin 
to that pre-national Medicare than a continuation of the current status quo.  The difficulties of 
inter-provincial negotiation and the past record of the provinces in that regard both indicate 
that in the absence of a national framework such as that currently provided by the CHA, 
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decentralisation will likely equate with a loss of health benefits portability over time.  
Certainly it is difficult, particularly in light of the dismal history of past inter-provincial 
initiatives and the many differences and divisions which exist in Canada, to imagine a 
situation where all provinces and territories could meet and agree together on reasonably 
uniform and consistent terms and conditions for portability. 
The potential negative impacts of health care decentralisation do not end at the 
question of portability of benefits, however.  The concerns of centralists about a loss of the 
Canada Health Act protections also extend in particular to two other of the five conditions 
and the health care guarantees they safeguard: accessibility and universality.187  These two 
conditions together form the nucleus of the constellation of values at the centre of Canadian 
Medicare.  Briefly put, the principle of accessibility permits no barriers, financial or 
otherwise, to access to medical care in Canada – in other words, access to care must be based 
solely on need for services, not on financial considerations or ability to pay.  Coupled with 
accessibility is the guarantee of universality – this condition requires that all Canadians, 
regardless of their particular backgrounds, medical histories, or geographical location, must 
receive (as nearly as possible) a basic uniform standard of medically necessary care under a 
uniform set of terms and conditions.   
A centralist would point out that the entire reason that the Canada Health Act was 
originally set in place, with provisions for financially penalising provinces which violated its 
terms and conditions, was due to the practices of extra-billing and user fees put in place by 
Alberta and a few other provinces, and this despite the fact that the values underlying 
Medicare (including barrier-free access based on need and according to uniform terms and 
conditions) have been widely accepted and indeed embraced by Canadians consistently since 
the 1950s.  As such, the common decentralist argument that ‘Medicare is here to stay as an 
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established program’ seems a good deal less convincing when placed into this larger context.  
Indeed, absent the protections of the CHA and the incentives it provides for provincial 
governments of every stripe to continue to respect the principle of barrier-free access, it is not 
outside the bounds of reason to suggest, given historical experience, that centre-right 
provincial governments in particular might exercise their new-found freedom of action by 
instituting practices which, under the present Medicare regime, would not be permitted.   
Then there is the issue of comprehensiveness – the principle which provides that all 
provincial/territorial public health insurance plans must fully cover all medically necessary 
hospital and physician services.188  As things stand presently, the provinces and territories 
largely offer the same ‘basket’ of medically necessary health care services on a universal 
basis across the federation, with a few minor differences between provinces.  Removing the 
requirement for comprehensiveness under the Canada Health Act would free every 
provincial/territorial government from the incentive to offer the same ‘basket’ of health care 
services.  In more centre-right provinces, there would be a definite potential for services 
which are guaranteed under the current regime to be de-listed, and perhaps moved to the 
private sector to increase ‘efficiency’ and cut down on what is perceived to be excessive 
public expenditure.  All provincial governments regardless of their ideological bent however 
might have another strong incentive to shrink the basket.  The provinces are perennially the 
more ‘fiscally challenged’ order of government, a situation which exists in the context of the 
fact that health care is consistently near, if not at, the top line of any list of provincial 
expenditure responsibilities; and further that, due to the nature of medicine, the rapid pace of 
technological change, and other factors, health care costs are continually expanding over 
time.  Thus, in a situation where the Canada Health Act was removed, it would be very 
tempting for the provinces to ease the growing burden of steadily expanding health care 
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expenditures by de-listing certain items from their ‘baskets’ of publicly-insured health care 
services.  In other words, what an individual Canadian ‘got’ in terms of health care – i.e., 
which health care services remained publicly-insured instead of being paid for out-of-pocket 
or by private insurance – would vary depending on which province he or she happened to 
find themselves in.  How much it would vary remains open to conjecture, but it is not 
unreasonable to argue that the level of variation across the Canadian federation would be 
potentially significant. 
In short, a centralist would argue as follows.  While it may be true that decentralists 
have advanced a coherent framework which would theoretically enhance fiscal responsibility 
(cause governments to spend less) while simultaneously reducing corrosive conflict between 
the federal and provincial governments and making the federation function better by 
clarifying (i.e. compartmentalising) roles and responsibilities, it would be at a cost which 
should warrant serious concern.  Specifically, where currently Medicare represents one of the 
great unifiers of Canadian citizenship in that it is based upon widely accepted values and 
entitles every Canadian to the same publicly-insured health benefits wherever in the country 
they might reside, a more decentralised system would almost certainly have more of a 
patchwork appearance.  Such a system would be characterised more by the inevitable inter-
provincial differences which would arise than the current situation, where the knowledge that 
every Canadian is entitled to the same publicly-insured health care benefits contributes to a 
sense of identity which is more truly national in character.  There may be thirteen individual 
provincial/territorial public health insurance plans, but needs-based access to medically 
necessary health care is without question an entitlement which people conceive of within a 
truly national dimension as being a feature of a uniquely Canadian social citizenship, not 
their citizenship within the particular subnational jurisdiction in which they happen to live. 
67 
This is particularly the case because as has been examined thus far in laying out the 
position of centralists, greater decentralisation of health care could quite possibly equate with 
greater differentiation among provinces, i.e., a more decentralised federation may equate with 
a more regionalised one.  This is concerning for centralists because there are so few common 
ties which bind Canadians together into one true national identity.  For example, 
economically speaking Canada is essentially a collection of unique regions rather than a 
homogenous whole.  The economic interests of British Columbia are very different from 
those of Alberta, and those of the Maritimes, different again.  Political values also tend to 
diverge noticeably depending upon what region of the country one examines.  Centralists 
caution that in a country that is already defined a great deal by what sets one region apart 
from another economically, politically, geographically etc., careful consideration should be 
given before adopting any proposal the potential effects of which included weakening the 
national dimensions of one of the few aspects of Canadian citizenship which is broadly 
shared across the country.  Health care alone is one area where citizens, regardless of their 
province of residence, can agree that their interests coincide with those of Canadians in other 
regions.  The vast majority of Canadians identify with the principle of needs-based barrier-
free access to health care.  That level of consensus and commonality of interests is not found 
in almost any other area of Canadian public life.  Centralists therefore believe that it is vital 
that before changing Canada’s health care system, time is taken to carefully consider the 
potential negative impacts of removing the federal government’s ability to exercise any truly 
national influence on the character of health insurance in Canada – negative impacts in the 
form both of the substantive differences that might emerge in terms of the medical care 
Canadians could expect across the country, and in terms of the negative consequences this 
differentiation could have for Canadians’ sense of national unity, identity, and shared social 
citizenship. 
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Centralists believe an alternative and, in many respects, superior way to go about 
bringing substantive, systemic, transformative change to the Canadian health care system is 
by means which are precisely the opposite of what decentralists propose: namely, a 
resurgence, not a retreat, of the role of the federal government in the health care enterprise.  
Centralists believe that this will produce substantive reforms while avoiding the pitfalls they 
associate with the decentralist approach.  Centralists propose change, but in their view, it 
ought to be change and reform which takes place within the existing framework of public 
health insurance in Canada.  Centralists believe that the proposals of decentralists such as 
Boessenkool are too extreme – in seeking to accomplish worthwhile goals (efficiency, cost 
control, fiscal responsibility, a more ‘rationally structured federation’) these proposals go too 
far in terms of their potential negative impacts. 
4.3 An Alternate Vision: A Substantive, Centralist Alternative to Decentralisation 
To find the alternative centralist vision for Canadian health care, one need look no 
farther than the recommendations of the 2002 Royal Commission on the Future of Health 
Care in Canada.  To summarise, the Commission recommended that: 
• The original ’50-50 Medicare bargain’ should be restored; however, taking into 
account the 1977 permanent transfer of tax room, the federal contribution should in 
fact equal roughly 25 per cent.   
• This federal contribution should take the form of an all-cash, conditional federal 
transfer payment (with payment contingent on adherence to the Canada Health Act 
conditions).   
• This transfer was to expand over time according to a fixed escalator provision in 
effect for five-year periods, the precise details of which were to be determined in 
negotiations between the two orders of government.  
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• There was to be targeted federal funding (i.e. cost-sharing) in identified priority areas 
to encourage transformational systemic change. 
• The Canada Health Act was to be renewed, strengthened, updated, and expanded by: 
o Clarifying the principle of portability and comprehensiveness; 
o Maintaining the principles of public administration, universality, and 
accessibility; 
o Adding a new principle of accountability.  Substantively this would mean both 
orders of government clarifying roles, expectations and responsibilities, 
recommitting to the principles of the CHA, and making the governance, 
negotiations, and fiscal structure of health care more open and transparent to 
Canadians. 
o Expanding the basket of CHA services to meet the evolving health care needs 
of Canadians.  Two solid beginning steps would be by including home care 
and pharmacare in federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements in the same 
manner as other services currently in the provincial ‘baskets.’ 
A slight variation on the proposals of the 2002 Royal Commission was set forth by 
Marchildon.  In keeping with the Royal Commission recommendations, Marchildon argued 
that the best way forward was for Ottawa to once again ‘become a real partner in 
Medicare.’189  In theoretical terms this meant that both orders of government should 
substantively engage and negotiate with one another not only to recommit to the foundational 
principles of Medicare, but also to reach a substantive, long-term agreement on its future 
direction and operative principles.190  Further, the federal government should end the use of 
non-conditional block transfers for health care, which lack a clear policy purpose or rationale 
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because they impose no accountability on the provinces which receive them.  Instead, the 
provinces should receive a set per-capita all-cash transfer based on a national average which 
would increase according to a fixed, agreed-upon escalator provision, as the Royal 
Commission recommended.191  This transfer would be conditional, with infringement of the 
agreed-upon CHA principles resulting in ‘dollar-for-dollar’ penalties such as those that were 
assessed against user fees and extra-billing.192  Increasing the federal contribution to a 
reasonable, reliable level, Marchildon argued (in line with the proposals of the Royal 
Commission), would give the federal government a meaningful stake in ‘fiscal risks’ of the 
system, and provide it with the moral legitimacy to initiate the consultative intergovernmental 
dialogue required for the process of recommitment to core values and reform of Canada’s 
Medicare system.193  Further, it would allow this reform, renewal, and expansion effort to be 
a truly pan-national undertaking with truly national dimensions and direction, rather than a 
piecemeal effort among provinces with no input from the over-arching national government – 
the one and only government which represents all citizens as ‘Canadians,’ rather than as 
inhabitants of a particular province or region.  The significance of it being a truly pan-
national undertaking is that only the federal government has the ability to provide national 
leadership and direction, to stand above the fray and represent the greater whole of Canada 
rather than its diverse regions with their divergent interests, and to guarantee that health 
services remain at consistent levels across the federation and respect the keystone principles 
which have come to define the system – barrier free access based on need and without 
differentiation based on geographical location.     
 Marchildon’s proposal does deviate from the recommendations of the 2002 Royal 
Commission Report in one significant respect, however.  While the Royal Commission 
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recommended that the federal transfer contribution for health should not be greater or less 
than 25 per cent of the national average per-capita health care costs, Marchildon suggested 
that a better alternative might be for the federal government to actually reduce the total 
transfer under the CHT to the minimum needed to maintain the policy purpose of that 
transfer, namely, ensuring the terms of the CHA remained meaningful – he reckoned this to 
be equivalent to roughly one-half the amount of the present CHT.194  He continues,  
Second, I would reinvest the money thus freed up to both reinforce and extend our half-
century old Medicare house to ensure public health care is more sustainable for the 21st 
century.  This could be accomplished by the federal government cost-sharing an expanded 
basket of universal services which the provincial governments would be responsible for 
administering.  In exchange for federal funding, Ottawa would enact an appropriate set of 
national standards or principles through an extension of the Canada Health Act or, if co-
payments and user fees were to attach to the new services, through another parallel (though 
not identical) law.195   
 
However, he surmises that many provinces in this era of increasingly assertive 
subnational jurisdictions might balk even at the suggestion of the imposition of any national 
standards.196  Furthermore, the potential alternative of having intergovernmental agreements 
to regulate national standards has had a long shadow cast over it by the utter failure of three 
previous health accords, which were notable for their ambiguity, poor accountability, and 
near-total lack of enforcement.197  Given these considerations, Marchildon proposes that a 
workable alternative might be for the federal government to ‘take an ownership position in 
public health care by funding and administering a national Pharmacare program.’198  This 
proposal would have a number of advantages, he asserts.  First, it would achieve the goal of 
expanding Medicare in a significant way which would better the lives of ordinary Canadians, 
since drug costs are one of the most rapidly expanding areas of personal health expenditure, 
while drug coverage for Canadians is largely private (often through work plans) and highly 
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inconsistent across the country.  Second, this is the one health sector where the federal 
government’s constitutional footing is all but uncontested, and in many respects stronger than 
that of the provincial governments.199  Third, with the separate provincial prescription drug 
programs being one of the largest single cost drivers in health care since the 1970s and this 
trend likely to only accelerate, a federal Pharmacare program would have the effect of lifting 
an enormous cost-burden from the shoulders of the fiscally challenged provinces.200  Fourth, 
although the costs of a truly national Pharmacare program would no doubt appear to represent 
a major burden to the federal treasury, this is offset by the fact that the regulatory machinery 
is already largely in place to control cost more effectively than could ever be done at the 
provincial level.201  Fifth, there are already relevant type cases/examples in operation, with 
central government-run Pharmacare programs in place in both Australia and New Zealand.202  
Sixth, the federal-only Pharmacare plan would be essentially a coverage plan, avoiding the 
complexities of service delivery found in other health care sectors.203  And finally but perhaps 
most importantly, Pharmacare would ‘provide a direct accountability relationship [which has 
previously been absent] between the Government of Canada and individual Canadians, a 
program that could over time become a national unifier in an already highly decentralised and 
asymmetrical federation.’204 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
These proposals, although they differ slightly in the means they suggest, clearly 
reflect the strong centralist belief that the federal government has an important role to play in 
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revitalising Canadian health care.  More than that, however, they believe that in their 
insistence on speaking only of efficiency, accountability, rationality of structure, and 
improved intergovernmental harmony, decentralists miss the larger potential for nation- and 
identity-building that is an inherent, and important, part of the Canadian Medicare enterprise.  
Centralists argue that there is an opportunity here not just to renew and expand Canada’s 
health care system, but also to strengthen the truly pan-Canadian national dimensions of the 
system through a thorough-going re-engagement of both orders of government when it comes 
to the enterprise of health care.   
Centralists believe that the way forward is for the federal government to reverse the 
trend of the past two decades and to step forward to take a greater ownership stake in the 
Canadian health care system once again.  In substantive terms this means making conditional 
transfers for health that are at a meaningful level, one high enough to ensure the broad 
conditions of the Canada Health Act, but not so high as to encourage provincial fiscal 
irresponsibility.  By virtue of taking a meaningful fiscal stake in the Medicare enterprise, the 
federal government will have the moral legitimacy to begin to provide leadership and a 
national direction to health care once again, encouraging both orders of government to come 
to the table to recommit to the core values of health care in Canada, and to determine what 
principles will guide health care into the future.  Unlike decentralists, centralists believe that 
the broad structures of Medicare which are already in place are workable, and while there are 
negative incentives present in its current structure, these are not insurmountable.  Instead, all 
that is needed is to modify the structure so as to make the intergovernmental health 
partnership more open and accountable to public scrutiny, and for both orders of government 
to re-engage with one another in a substantive dialogue about the direction of the Canadian 
health care system and their respective roles within it.  Above all this means that both orders 
of government must be clearer in the way that they communicate with each other and with the 
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public.  Both orders of government must end the sterile debates over the level of transfers, 
respect the role of the other in the federal-provincial balance that comprises the Medicare 
partnership, and end the blame-shifting and buck-passing that have characterised the 
intergovernmental relationship in Medicare.  Changing this does not require changing the 
structure in the dramatic way that decentralists have proposed; it merely requires 
governments, premiers, finance Ministers, and prime ministers, to be more transparent, less 
politically motivated, and more engaged in the way they communicate, both 
intergovernmentally and with the public. 
For a centralist, Medicare is more than mere policy or a program, it is also a focal 
point of Canadian identity and the idea of a shared Canadian social citizenship.  It speaks to a 
country which is not just an economic union but also a social union, one where Canadians 
across the country receive the same standard of social entitlements which they identify as 
being linked to their citizenship not in their province, but in their country.  This is critical 
because economically and politically, Canada is by and large more diverse than it is united.  
Decentralising proposals may indeed have the effect of reducing intergovernmental friction 
and forcing provinces to trim their spending on health by having the federal government walk 
away from health care and leaving the thirteen diverse subnational units to ‘figure it out’ 
amongst themselves – but centralists ask at what cost this seemingly eminently simple 
solution might come? Their answer is the risk of a country which is defined by difference and 
by the potential for inequalities of access to vital public services.  By contrast, centralists feel 
that their proposals will avoid the negatives centrifugal incentives of decentralisation, and 
instead lead to a return to a healthy, balanced intergovernmental partnership, resulting in a 
more comprehensive, equitable, and consistent health care system with a firmer and more 
pan-national sense of its underlying principles and direction, existing within a country with a 
stronger sense of a shared, and uniquely Canadian social citizenship and identity. 
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Chapter 5 – Summary, Analysis & Conclusions/Recommendations 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
 The preceding two chapters examined two quite different visions of the direction the 
Canadian health care system ought to proceed in the 21st century.  Chapter 3 laid out a 
decentralised vision of Canadian health care, one in which primary responsibility for health 
care would be devolved to the provinces and territories.  Consequent to this, the federal 
government would have little to no role in this new version of the health care enterprise.  
Instead, it would simply transfer more tax room to the provinces in order to allow them to 
raise their own revenues for health care.  This would help better control costs by ending the 
fiscal illusion caused by provinces ‘spending another order of government’s money,’ and 
would allow provincial governments to be more directly held to account by their voters for 
the health care dollars they spend. 
 Chapter 4 set out a sharply contrasting vision of a second school of thought – one 
which believes that a resurgent federal role in the Canadian health care system is vital to the 
continued stability and well-being of the system, and also has implications for Canadian unity 
and identity.  Centralists believe that a preoccupation with simplicity of structure and division 
of responsibilities has the capacity to develop into a situation where access to care and 
equality of care might become uneven across the country.  This would be due to both the 
differences in fiscal capacity of the provinces, but more so the lack of over-arching, truly 
national standards which would be consequent to a decentralisation of health care 
responsibilities and authority to the provinces and territories.  With a total transfer of GST 
revenue-raising capability, the federal government would lose the ability to act as a guarantor 
of broad national standards in health care through its federal legislation, the Canada Health 
Act.  In the absence of these guarantees, it is likely that the five conditions which form the 
health guarantees of equality of access across the federation and with which Canadians have 
76 
come to identify would begin to break down.  Centralists therefore caution against the 
adoption of proposals which advocate for watertight divisions of authority, responsibility, and 
revenue-raising when it comes to the structure of Medicare in Canada.  While these may 
seem simple and intuitively attractive on their face, centralists warn, the result of such 
proposals could well be the degradation of the health care guarantees which Canadians have 
come to expect, at least in some jurisdictions   
Consequent to a lack of over-arching national direction and increasing differentiation 
in the health care received from one region to another, centralists suggest that Canadians 
would have a weaker sense of a truly national Canadian social citizenship, one where their 
medical care, which was once conceived of being a distinguishing feature of being Canadian, 
would now necessarily be more identified with their province of residence.  As such, the 
sense of Canadian identity might be weakened, and the sense of inter-regional political, 
economic, and social difference exacerbated, leading to a less unified federation.   
Centralists suggest that all this can be avoided by the federal government moving to 
take an ownership role in health care once again.  They suggest that the federal government 
should again fund Medicare at an ‘ownership stake’ benchmark, using conditional cash 
transfers based upon the values captured within a new, updated Canada Health Act.  The 
structure overall would be an arrangement more akin to the ‘original bargain’ in Canadian 
health care laid out in Chapter 2, modernised, expanded, and updated to meet the challenges 
and priorities of the 21st century.  While this would be a less drastic solution than decentralist 
proposals for a final transfer of GST points and near-total devolution of health care to the 
provinces, centralists believe it would both avoid many pitfalls of the decentralist approach 
while simultaneously strengthening Medicare more effectively than ever could be done by 
decentralist proposals, all while protecting and even strengthening national unity and a sense 
of truly national Canadian citizenship and identity.   
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 This chapter will comprise an analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of each 
school of thought set out in the previous two chapters.  Consideration will also be given to 
some of the potential impacts of each school of thought in terms of the future of the health 
care system itself, as well as more broadly the effective functioning of the Canadian 
federation and the question of Canadian unity and identity.  The chapter will end by drawing 
some conclusions and fielding some arguments about which school of thought, based on the 
analysis undertaken in the context of this chapter, offers the best option for Canada’s health 
care system to effectively continue its evolution moving into the 21st century. 
5.2 The Decentralist School – Analysis 
 
 The decentralist proposal for health care in Canada undeniably has a number of 
strengths.  First, the implementation of such a system would indeed bring greater clarity of 
roles, authority, and responsibilities in health – health would be declared an area of de facto 
exclusive provincial jurisdiction and authority, and the federal government would of 
necessity under this new structure withdraw entirely from the field, leaving no ambiguity as 
to which level of government bears total responsibility for health care.  Both levels of 
government would be left free to concentrate their spending and attention on areas which, at 
least in the decentralist view, are most appropriate to their respective order of government.  
For the provinces, this would mean above all health and education, while the federal 
government would play no part in these provincial matters and would instead focus on more 
‘genuine’ national priorities, such as trade and commerce and national defence.   
If the objective is to create a situation of greater intergovernmental harmony, free 
governments to focus on ‘appropriate’ priorities and end federal-provincial bickering, the 
decentralist proposal is a theoretically excellent one.  Like a well-placed pass of a scalpel, the 
decentralist proposal would in one fell swoop compartmentalise federal and provincial 
authority, and by this means remove what has historically been perhaps the largest single 
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irritant in the Canadian intergovernmental relations regime.  No longer would there be a need 
for the federal and provincial governments to engage in unending and unproductive funding 
negotiations and blame-shifting such as that which characterised the health care field in the 
1990s.  It can thus plausibly be argued that the result will be a more harmonious, more 
efficient, more rationally structured federal system, one where the orders of government will 
not be bogged down by intergovernmental conflict, but will instead stick to responsibilities 
which are most appropriate to their position in the political regime.  A more decentralised 
(i.e. compartmentalised) federation is quite plausibly a more harmonious one. 
Second, there is the issue of the costs of health care.  Health care is already at the top 
line of expenditures for provincial governments.  Further, the ongoing march of medical 
technology, an aging population, and the steady proliferation of prescription drug patents 
(among other factors) mean that health care expenditures as a percentage of public 
expenditure will foreseeably continue to expand rapidly over time.  Given that almost all the 
provinces are currently narrowly skirting deficits or running deficits, cost control will be a 
necessary priority in health care moving into the 21st century.  A major strength of 
decentralisation proposals is that they provide a concrete mechanism for dealing with this 
identified problem in publicly-funded health insurance.  Since the provincial government 
would be granted sole responsibility for health care, there would be no question among 
citizens of a given province about which level of government was responsible for health care 
outcomes, and the public spending that was done in comparison to the health outcomes that 
were obtained.  Further, the citizens of a province would no longer be under the influence of 
the fiscal illusion – that phenomenon which occurs when there is a gap between the levels of 
expenditures of a government, and the taxes paid by that government’s taxpayers to finance 
those expenditures.  As such, it is very plausible that if provinces were required to raise all 
their own revenues to meet expenditures, including health expenditures, provincial citizen-
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taxpayers would be more likely to act as a ‘brake’ on those expenditures.  Thus, the 
decentralist framework should be credited with providing a hypothetically workable structure 
of incentives to bring about needed cost control in publicly-funded health insurance.   
 Further, both the federal government and more particularly the provinces have good 
reasons, especially from a pragmatic perspective, for embracing the decentralist vision of 
health care in Canada.  From the perspective of the federal government, ending its transfers 
for health will mean it will no longer bear the burden of transferring massive amounts of 
federal money to the provinces for health care in return for very little thanks.  From the 
perspective of the provinces, they face the spectre that federal transfers may well have 
reached their zenith and will likely remain the same, if not decline, for the foreseeable future.  
A decentralising framework such as that put forward by Boessenkool would provide the 
provinces with an opportunity to ‘lock in’ a steady source of own-source revenue, without 
having to rely on the vagaries of federal transfer payments, another problem which has 
dogged the health care funding regime, particularly in the last one to two decades.  Indeed, 
the decentralist proposal would in some respects be a dream come true for the traditionally 
fiscally challenged provinces, granting them exclusive control over an entire tax field and 
giving them the latitude to make spending decisions free of any constraining federal 
conditionality.  This in turn would allow them the freedom to innovate and experiment as 
much as they saw fit when it comes to health care delivery – which would theoretically result 
in finding greater efficiencies and reducing costs. 
 In short, the vision of the decentralist school of thought for the future of Canadian 
health care is a strong one in a number of respects.  This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that it correctly identifies a number of issues which have affected universal publicly-funded 
health insurance in Canada, particularly within the last two decades.  The proposals of 
decentralists should be credited as representing a wide-ranging attempt to respond to these 
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issues.  Furthermore, although it is of course impossible to tell as any analysis will 
necessarily be dealing in hypotheticals, as has been argued here it is highly plausible that the 
decentralist proposal would represent not only a meaningful framework for change, but 
would have a quite high probability of achieving most of the aims that the framework is 
intended to achieve, most of which are worthy goals.  By these measures, the decentralist 
proposal does have merits. 
 The decentralist vision is not without its weaknesses, however.  While it may be 
theoretically excellent on its own terms from the point of view of structuring the federation 
more ‘rationally’ or ‘logically,’ and by this means achieving better cost control in Canadian 
health care and a better-structured federal system with more harmonious relations between 
the orders of government (which is to say, less for the two orders of government to have to 
relate with one another about), it is a vision which is overwhelmingly preoccupied by 
economic concerns.  In this respect, the centralist criticisms of the decentralist vision are on-
point: proposals such as Boessenkool’s give very little, if any consideration to what the larger 
impacts of their particular proposals might be.  In other words, while the Boessenkool 
proposal is hypothetically excellent on its own terms, Boessenkool gives almost no 
consideration whatsoever to any impacts which might occur were his proposals to be 
implemented, outside of his stated goals of reducing public sector expenditure, enhancing 
accountability, and rationalising the Canadian federal structure. 
 First and foremost, if the decentralist vision for health care were to become a reality in 
Canada, it would unquestionably be a radical departure from the entire history of the system 
so far.  As laid out in Chapter 2, Medicare has been built up organically over time as evolving 
partnership between the two orders of government, with a federal-provincial balance where 
each stakeholder in the system has had a role to play appropriate to its position.  Particularly 
since the passage of the Canada Health Act in 1984, the provinces have been left with a 
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largely free hand to administer and oversee the day-to-day operation of the system; and the 
federal government has been responsible for providing an over-arching national direction, 
and ensuring that the various provincial health insurance plans are broadly consistent in terms 
of their philosophy and the level of services offered, regardless of where in Canada the 
citizen who is seeking medical care might be located.  The decentralist proposal would mean 
a dramatic and unprecedented change in this regime and an end to this federal balance which, 
while it has not been without its problems, has represented an example of federal-provincial 
engagement and co-operation to achieve public policy goods which were being demanded by 
the Canadian public.  This legacy would be decidedly ignored should a proposal such as 
Boessenkool’s be adopted for Canadian Medicare.  Further, it should be noted that though it 
may be true that this balance has functioned less effectively of late because the federal 
government has increasingly shirked its responsibilities and failed to provide that leadership 
and financing, this is not in itself an argument for the federal government to get out of the 
business of health care entirely, since Ottawa could assume the mantle of leadership and 
responsibility again if it so chose – a possibility decentralist proposals pre-emptively dismiss. 
 Indeed, the decentralist vision is open to criticism because it gives little or no 
consideration of what a total federal withdrawal or abdication of responsibility in the field of 
health care would mean for the future of the Canadian health system.  Here the criticisms of 
centralists are very much on point.  If the provinces receive a final transfer of tax points, and 
the federal government no longer makes transfers for health, the Canada Health Act will 
indeed be a dead-letter law, as the transfers are the mechanism by which the Act is enforced.  
The removal of the conditionality imposed by the CHA would almost invite the provinces to 
make changes to their particular public health insurance schemes – the motivation for which 
could either be purely pragmatic (fiscal considerations in the case of the poorer provinces, 
even more ‘left-leaning’ ones), or linked to their own ideological proclivities and ideas about 
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personal responsibility and the proper role of the state.  In some provinces, a citizen might 
find that their health care needs were being met very well within the context of a not-for-
profit public health insurance system.  In another, however, a citizen might find that the 
services they had previously been guaranteed by the protection of the CHA had been cut or 
moved to the private for-profit sector.  To invite this possibility fundamentally offends the 
core values which have come to identify the Canadian approach to providing health care and 
opens the gates to inequality of access and quality of medical care available amongst sectors 
of the Canadian population.  Such a situation is morally objectionable and not to be 
countenanced.  
  The decentralist vision gives no consideration to the potential consequences of 
compartmentalisation of authority and responsibility that would occur were such a framework 
to be put in place.  While such a regime might well make the federation more harmonious at 
one level by removing one area where there has traditionally been a great deal of tension in 
intergovernmental relations, it might well also make the federation a more fractured one at a 
more fundamental level.  Under the new decentralised regime, health insurance would be tied 
to province of residence, and with no health guarantees such as those which currently exist 
through the Canada Health Act, the services one received would likely be different, and of 
differing quality, depending on which province one happened to live.  In effect, this end to 
the national dimensions of health care would re-define the appropriate ‘sharing community’ 
in this field as being not national, but provincial.  In a country which is as immensely 
economically, politically, and culturally diverse – not to mention territorially dispersed – as 
Canada, this invites a sense of regionalism and differentiation into a field which was before 
considered to be one of the major unifying features of Canadian citizenship.  While 
economically, politically, and culturally a British Columbian feels little in common with an 
Albertan, and an Albertan even less in common with a Québécois(e) or a Maritimer and vice-
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versa, one thing that unites them all under the current Medicare regime is that they are all 
entitled to the same standard of basic medical care under uniform terms and conditions on the 
basis of need, not ability to pay.  Given that Canada is massively diverse and sometimes 
seems to be defined more by its differences than by its similarities, any proposal which 
invites a greater sense of inter-regional or inter-provincial differentiation should be weighed 
very carefully.   
Decentralist advocates are content to argue that public opinion will hold provincial 
governments to account, preventing them from making any changes to the system such as 
delisting certain items of care from the field of public health insurance, instituting user fees, 
etc.  In fact, however, the historical record does not support this position.  Fairly significant 
violations of the five health care principles have occurred even when those principles were 
well-established and had broad public support.  For example, this was seen when a few 
provinces instituted extra-billing and user fees, necessitating the passage of the Canada 
Health Act to end this practice.  Extra-billing and user fees were very clearly in contravention 
of values which, based upon polling and the findings of two Royal Commissions, most 
Canadians support and have consistently supported in the five decades since national public 
health insurance began in Canada.  Indeed, the decentralist preoccupation with accountability 
for health spending and outcomes is almost ironic in a sense because its vision for Canadian 
Medicare removes the most powerful tool of accountability which exists in the system – the 
Canada Health Act.  In place of this clear-cut regulation, accountability for health care 
services and outcomes would be left to the highly indirect mechanism of provincial elections, 
which are fixed in most provinces at every four years.  Exactly how public policy decisions 
of a government translate into electoral outcomes is a massively complex subject far outside 
the scope of the present inquiry.  Suffice it to say, however, that the link between public 
policy decisions and electoral outcomes is a far more uncertain protection for health care 
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guarantees than the protections currently afforded by the five conditions of the Canada 
Health Act. 
5.3 The Centralist School – Analysis 
 
 Centralists have a very different vision for the future of Canadian health care than that 
proposed by decentralists.  Like the decentralist vision, the vision of centralists has a number 
of number of strengths and also its share of shortcomings.  This section will consider first the 
strengths of centralist proposals, and then address the areas where these proposals may fall 
short. 
 The first thing that can be said for the centralist vision is that it is not, as with 
Boessenkool and other decentralist proposals, a dramatic departure from the past trajectory of 
the Medicare system as it currently exists.  Thus, it is likely an easier option to implement 
than the alternatives which Boessenkool and others present.  The centralist framework would 
respect the fact that Medicare grew up organically over time as an intergovernmental 
partnership – one where each level of government played a role that it was most suited to 
playing in the federation.  This meant that the federal government provided a national 
direction and leadership (as well as needed funding in matching conditional grants to make 
the implementation of Medicare possible), and the provinces as well as providing funding 
were left to see to the detailed administration and operation of health care on the ground, 
constrained only by the bounds of a broad constellation of five general basic values.  
Critically, agreement upon this ‘constellation’ of five broad over-arching values was not 
imposed upon one order of government by the other, but was instead reached in intense 
negotiation between the two partners in the health care enterprise as representing or 
encapsulating the appropriate Canadian values respecting health care – values which the 
national order of government was then entrusted with ensuring.  This resulted in an 
arrangement which is both balanced and logical, capitalising on the strengths and positions of 
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each of the stakeholders in the system and what roles they are best suited to play.  The 
centralist proposal for Medicare moving forward would respect and continue this balance, 
while recognising that, as centralists argue, meaningful change could still take place within 
this framework.   
 The centralist proposal for health care would ensure continuity and avoid the need to 
alter the existing regime in fundamental and therefore disruptive ways, while simultaneously 
providing a framework by which the Medicare system could be expanded, modernised, and 
updated to provide new services, and improved overall in its structure and operation.  This 
outcome would be achieved through a process of meaningful, constructive, and consistent 
engagement between the federal and provincial-territorial orders of government.  Evidence 
for this assertion can be found in the simple fact that the prototype for this process already 
exists: it was the very process by which national publicly-funded health insurance for 
medically necessary hospital and physician services first came into existence in Canada.  If 
the provinces and the federal government were able to constructively engage with one 
another and reach comprehensive agreement to create a wholly new, jointly funded national 
public health insurance program in the early 1960s, there is no reason to suppose that they 
cannot together reach an agreement to expand and improve that program to meet the 
changing health care needs of the Canadian populace today.  While this proposition may be 
the subject of debate and may be flatly denied by decentralists who feel that their proposal is 
a more workable solution, the historical record is clear that such initiative is possible, 
especially since the relevant situational factors have really not changed that much in the 
intervening decades.  The Canadian public still consistently rates Medicare as one of their top 
priorities and opposes any significant change to the existing health care system, and the 
situation of the two partners in the enterprise is basically the same as it was in the 1960s, 
especially fiscally speaking.  That is to say, the provinces oversee the day-to-day operation of 
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the health care system but are more fiscally challenged than Ottawa, so a balance is struck 
wherein Ottawa provides transfers to the provinces to help meet the costs.  In other words, 
based upon the foregoing arguments, it is possible that meaningful change and reform to 
Medicare could take place, while still maintaining the federal balance which allowed 
Medicare to be established and be successful as a program. 
  A centralist approach involving a federal government which once again assumes an 
ownership stake in the system by contributing a reasonable share of the costs of Medicare, 
something more akin to the original ’50-50 bargain,’ adjusted down to around 25 per cent to 
account for the 1977 permanent tax points transfer, has additional advantages.  A federal 
government which once again acted as the guarantor of the five conditions of the Canada 
Health Act by making its enhanced transfers to the provinces for health conditional on stricter 
observance of the CHA principles would ensure that Canadians will continue to have some 
form of health guarantees.  This would mean that the care they are entitled to receive, the 
terms on which they are entitled to receive it, and the quality of the care they do receive 
would be broadly the same regardless of which province or region of the country they 
happened to reside in, visit, or move to in order to secure employment.  The fact is that 
outside the awkward instrument of entrenchment in the Charter, a remedy that would be 
protracted to obtain and would be the purview of those privileged few who could afford to 
absorb the costs of sustained litigation, there is no other way to ensure uniform health care 
services of uniform quality from coast to coast as effectively as the Canada Health Act has 
done.  A great strength of the centralist proposal is that it provides a framework in which 
change and renovation to the Medicare house can take place, without sacrificing the 
protection of the five CHA principles.   
 Of course, the centralist proposal has its points on which it can be criticised.  One 
argument that can be made against it is that the continuity it would entail is not a strength, but 
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instead a weakness.  It can be argued that the centralist vision is lacking as a proposal because 
it doesn’t really change anything, but merely advocates what some see to be a return to the 
past, or a continuation of the status quo.  The centralist proposal can indeed be criticised for 
the fact that it does not, as the decentralist school does, provide a framework by which to 
reverse the incentives which have encouraged provinces to spend more on health care and not 
control costs.  In this respect, the decentralist proposal more directly addresses these 
identified shortcomings of the Medicare system. 
As a corollary to this, another criticism of the centralist proposal is that it requires 
placing a great deal of faith in the altruism of politicians in both orders of government.  It 
must be acknowledged that much of the dysfunction that has come to characterise 
intergovernmental relations in health care has been the result of structural incentives of the 
system, something decentralists provide a definite series of solutions to with their proposals.  
By contrast, the centralist proposal would be heavily dependent on both federal and 
provincial leaders ‘stepping up to the plate’ to engage in a substantive, sustained, and 
effective dialogue with the other order of government across a wide spectrum of issues.  For 
example, the centralist proposal calls for a renewed, strengthened, and expanded Canada 
Health Act, and to really make this effective the amount of coordination and dialogue 
between the federal and provincial-territorial governments would be significant.  For this to 
be a truly worthwhile collaborative effort would require a level of sustained, constructive 
engagement between the two orders of government which Canada has not seen for perhaps 
half a century.  It would require provincial politicians to go against the incentives of the 
system and forego blaming Ottawa for failures, or sounding an incessant refrain for more 
federal dollars.  And it would require the federal government to have a clear idea of its role in 
this enterprise, a clear conception of a national direction, and to be similarly responsible in 
the way it communicated its position.  In other words, it would demand a great deal.  One of 
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the biggest arguments against the centralist position, therefore, may be to point out that, 
particularly in comparison to decentralist proposals, it may simply put too much faith in the 
ability, or the willingness, of politicians to undertake the difficult work of trying to 
cooperatively reform and improve the Medicare system.   
5.4 Conclusions & Recommendations for Future Directions 
 
Up to this point, an account has been provided of the past trajectory of Canada’s 
health care system from its inception up to the present day.  This was followed by a 
comprehensive review of the positions of two widely-divergent schools of thought as to what 
the proper direction for Canada’s health care system in terms of intergovernmental relations 
should be moving forward into the 21st century.  Strengths and shortcomings of each vision 
were then examined, recognising that any proposal will have both its positive and negative 
points, which must be balanced and considered within the larger context of Medicare in 
Canada.  Only one task now remains in terms of the present project: taking account of all the 
foregoing, what conclusions can be drawn about the implications of each of the two visions 
for Canadian Medicare examined here?  And based the analysis contained within these pages, 
what recommendations can be made as to which vision out of the two examined here offers 
the best overall choice for the future of the Canadian health care system and the Canadian 
federation?  It is to that sole remaining inquiry that attention is now turned. 
The decentralist vision, best exemplified by Ken Boessenkool’s argument for a final 
transfer of GST tax points to the provinces, is without question a very strong proposal.  It 
correctly identifies a number of shortcomings in the Canadian health care system – expanding 
costs; chronic intergovernmental tensions and dysfunctional federal-provincial relations; lack 
of clarity surrounding governmental roles and responsibilities on the part of the public; 
irrationality in the fiscal federal structure – and provides a very definitive framework, 
fundamentally different from the existing system, with a strong system of incentives designed 
89 
to combat those problems.  The decentralist proposal should be credited for isolating these 
problems and providing solutions which are hypothetically workable.  Indeed, in the final 
analysis, if the measure of excellence is to identify systemic problems in Medicare and to 
provide concrete, workable solutions which will address those problems, the decentralist 
proposal is an excellent one on its own terms.  Further, not only does it achieve worthy goals, 
it provides a solution that both the federal and provincial orders of government could quite 
possibly find attractive for their own reasons.   
However, the decentralist proposal is very weak in one critical respect: it gives little 
to no consideration of the larger impacts which might occur were its proposals to be 
implemented.  First and foremost, decentralising health care would mean an end to a 
meaningful federal role in the field.  It would mean granting the provinces exclusive 
jurisdiction over health, and providing them with an entire tax field, topped up by 
unconditional federal transfers which would, theoretically at least, equalise provincial fiscal 
capacity.  As such, the Canada Health Act would, in fact be a dead letter law, since the 
Canada Health Transfer is and always has been the mechanism by which the CHA was of any 
effect.  Therefore, the first major effect of the decentralist proposal would be to remove the 
health guarantees which Canadians now enjoy.  Decentralists argue that the provinces would 
be prevented by ‘public opinion’ from changing any aspect of the health care system.  The 
historical record, however, does not support this assertion.  The provinces would indeed be 
left free to make changes to their health insurance plans, and likely would.  Inter-regional and 
inter-provincial differences in health care quality and coverage would likely begin to appear.  
The door would be opened to inequality of access and to inequality in terms of medical 
services received based on what region of the country one happened to reside in.  Such a 
situation is both contrary to the values that have come to define Canadian health care, and it 
is also morally objectionable.  There would likely be problems with inter-provincial co-
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ordination and portability of benefits.  In short, there would be serious potential 
consequences, none of which are given the adequate consideration by decentralist school 
advocates.  
  In sharp contrast stands the centralist vision for the future of Canadian health care.  It 
also recognises that there are problems in the Medicare system as it exists today and provides 
a comprehensive and well-articulated framework for change and reform.  More than that, 
however, it provides a framework which respects the past development of the Medicare 
system as a partnership, a unique federal balance between two orders of government where 
each performs the role it is best suited to playing, and neither government bears the whole 
burden of fiscal responsibility.   Even more than that, however, and in this respect, it is far 
superior to the decentralist proposal, it recognises the larger impacts of any changes to 
Canada’s health care system, a consideration that does not enter into the calculus of 
decentralists, or does so only in a very inadequate way.   
Centralists wish to reform, protect, strengthen, and expand the national dimensions of 
health care within the existing framework, recognising Medicare as being one of the few 
features which bind Canadians of all regions and provinces together into a larger self-
identifying whole.  Decentralists do not consider that Medicare is a focus of Canadian 
identity.  Their proposal implies a situation where the Canada Health Act and its five 
principles no longer apply, and health care is an exclusively provincial concern.  As 
centralists have argued, this invites a greater sense of inter-regional differentiation and 
regionalism in what is already very much a country of regions.  It removes the health 
guarantees to which Canadians have become accustomed – to uniform medical care under 
uniform terms and conditions – and replaces this with the delayed and indirect mechanism of 
quadrennial provincial elections.   
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 In terms of future directions, therefore, having weighed the pros and cons of both the 
decentralist and centralist proposals, it is the conclusion of the present inquiry that the single 
best option for Canadian Medicare moving forward into the 21st century is the adoption of the 
vision of the centralist school of thought.  Decentralisation may indeed meet the objectives it 
sets out to achieve in terms of putting a brake on provincial expenditures or making the fiscal 
structure of the federation more ‘rational’ and clarifying lines of accountability for tax and 
spending decisions – but the true questions which need to be asked is at what cost these 
reforms might come?  By contrast, the centralist vision provides a blueprint for reform, 
change, and expansion of the health care system, negotiated between both partners in the 
health care enterprise within the structure which already exists, and which historically has 
worked quite well.  At the same time, it retains intact the health care guarantees which 
Canadians currently enjoy, and which ensure that they receive a uniform standard of 
medically necessary care on uniform terms and conditions from coast to coast to coast – 
guarantees which would be threatened if decentralisation were to take place.  Finally, a 
resurgent federal role and renewed federal-provincial partnership in health care would 
unequivocally establish that Medicare is a feature of a uniquely Canadian social citizenship – 
not solely citizenship in one province.   
Ultimately, the centralist proposal achieves more worthy objectives than the 
decentralist proposal and provides a better framework for achieving them, one which has far 
less potential for collateral damage while still providing a blueprint for meaningful change.  
What is needed for the centralist vision to be successful, however, are politicians who 
respond to the same altruistic principles which motivated those who first responded to the 
demands of the Canadian people and made national public health insurance a reality in this 
country.  Today’s political leaders must forego the temptation of blame-shifting.  They must 
be responsible and clear in the way that they communicate, clarifying their roles and 
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responsibilities towards health care in a manner that the public understands.  And they must 
unreservedly commit to engage once again with one another in a sustained, messy, difficult, 
yet constructive manner in order to bring about real change in the health care system, 
reforming it, strengthening it, and expanding it to reflect the changing health needs of the 
Canadian populace while still making efforts to control costs.  They must respect that health 
care is a partnership in which each partner has its role and expertise, such that the provinces 
are left as free as possible to change, innovate, and find efficiencies within the broad 
conditions of the CHA, and the federal government confines itself to providing broad national 
direction and protection of the core values of the Act.  Above all, politicians must not 
succumb to the siren call of decentralism or open federalism.  Solutions which seem too 
simple, too straightforward, too logical, and too good to be true, often are.  While at a stroke 
decentralisation would remove the need for painful and protracted intergovernmental 
negotiation and perhaps render the intergovernmental arena and the federation a much more 
‘peaceful place,’ while providing incentives for the provinces to control costs, the negative 
consequences of this course of action, so clearly set out here, are too numerous, and too 
serious, to be discounted. It is up to Canada’s politicians, both federal and provincial, to in 
partnership take the first steps towards renovating a Medicare house which will serve 
Canadians well for the next half-century – and beyond.  
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